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THE  LAW  WANTS  TO  BE  FORMAL
Chaim Saiman*
This Article examines the relationship between the formalism of an area of law, and whether
it plays a central role in the legal system.  English and American law were traditionally com-
prised of formalist private law doctrines.  The influence of legal realism and the New Deal,
however, caused these systems to diverge.  While American private law was recast in realist terms,
it also became less significant to the overall legal system. In its place, procedure and statutory
interpretation emerged, and in turn became more formalized. Realism was never as influential in
England where private law remains more formal and at the center of legal analysis.  Procedural
and interpretation doctrines, by contrast, are less prevalent and less formalized.
These trends are related.  Law is attracted to formalism because a confined account of
judging provides the necessary contrast between constrained judicial decisionmaking and unfet-
tered political policymaking.  When private law is formalized, it can sustain the distinction
between law and politics.  But when private law is seen as too pliable, pressure mounts to recast
the law in a more formalist mode.  Realism did not eliminate formalism from American law but
caused it to migrate from the receding private law to the ascendant interpretation and procedure
doctrines.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article presents a straightforward claim: the law wants to be formal.
The argument is developed via a deep comparative dive into how formalism
and its alternatives are distributed and practiced in English and American
law.  The comparison is apt because these systems share common historical
roots and at one point analyzed legal questions through similar doctrinal
frameworks.1  Over time, however, they drifted apart and today differ on
1 See JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 194
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1894) (“Whoever achieves anything for the advancement or
improvement of the law, achieves it not for his own country alone, but for all English-
speaking . . . peoples.”); A.V. Dicey, A Common Citizenship for the English Race, 71 CONTEMP.
REV. 457, 469 (1897) (“An English barrister who lands . . . [in] New York feels for a
moment that he is a stranger . . . but when once he enters an American court, or begins
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 3 21-JAN-21 9:51
2021] the  law  wants  to  be  formal 1069
which legal areas are highly technical and formal, and which are more flexi-
ble and context sensitive.
From the American Revolution through the early decades of the twenti-
eth century, both English and American legal cultures were dominated by
the common law, especially the emerging areas of contract, tort, property,
agency, and equity, now classified as private law.  These subjects comprised
the vast majority of course offerings in the nascent American law schools and
the scholarship published in their law reviews.2  Lawsuits were typically two-
party affairs that focused on rights, duties, and obligations, while lawyers on
both sides of the Atlantic maintained relatively confined accounts of these
concepts.
In the early-to-middle decades of the twentieth century, however, much
of this began to change.  A movement known as American legal realism chal-
lenged the idea that private law was an autonomous system of legal reasoning
or that hard cases could be decided by precise legal logic alone.  Realists
argued that private law—like all law—was dominated by political, social, and
economic contests that neither could nor should be excluded from direct
consideration by the law.  Judges ceased to be seen as legal technicians work-
ing within the narrow confines of the law and were recast as powerful figures
whose actions both informed and influenced the political sphere.3
Hand in hand with the deconstruction of private law came the open
embrace of the role of the state in creating law.  Legal analysis shifted away
from private law and toward multiparty and multifactored questions of state-
craft brought about by the New Deal.4  Law was no longer an autonomous
debating legal questions with American lawyers, he knows that he is not abroad, but at
home . . . .”); see also Dan Priel, Conceptions of Authority and the Anglo-American Common Law
Divide, 65 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 609, 610–18 (2017) (analyzing these and related sources).
2 See, e.g., THE HARVARD UNIVERSITY CATALOGUE 1890–91, at 257–58 (Cambridge,
Harvard Univ. 1890); see also Edwin J. Greenlee, Essay, The University of Pennsylvania Law
Review: 150 Years of History, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1875, 1880–81 (2002) (observing that, in
late nineteenth century, law review publications contained “[d]octrinal articles focus[ed]
on legal rules in traditional areas such as contracts or torts,” and were “intimately tied to
the model of legal education based [on] the study of appellate cases”).
3 Standard accounts include: Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term—Foreword:
Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4, 8 (1982) (explaining that
classic lawsuits centered on disputes between private parties concerning consequences,
rights, and obligations, while “new” public lawsuits focus on “grievances over the adminis-
tration of [public] program[s] and to vindicate the public policies”); Gilbert S. Merritt,
Owen Fiss on Paradise Lost: The Judicial Bureaucracy in the Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J.
1469, 1472 (1983) (noting significant differences in the public versus private law content
of circuit court dockets between the 1920s and ’80s); Saul Zipkin, A Common Law Court in a
Regulatory World, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 285, 287 (2013) (observing that the common-law model
centering on individual disputes “is in some tension with the contemporary world of legis-
lation and administrative governing”).
4 See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284, 1296–97 (1976) (“[M]odern federal litigation . . . do[es] not arise out of dis-
putes between private parties about private rights,” but “the object of litigation is . . . vindi-
cation of constitutional or statutory policies.”); Zipkin, supra note 3, at 288 (observing that
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external force acting on the community, but a creation of the political com-
munity itself.5  Private law never went away under this regime, but was
marginalized.  Today it operates mainly in the increasingly shrinking gaps of
the regulatory state.6
Nevertheless, the formalism despised by the legal realists never abated,
and as the twentieth century progressed, a new brand of uniquely American
formalism emerged.  This version is grounded in a structural reading of the
Constitution’s allocation of power between governmental branches and finds
its doctrinal expression in the law of statutory interpretation and jurisdiction.
Like its private law analogue, American formalism is based on a structural
analysis of legal relationships and aims to confine legal analysis and limit
recourse to broader political values.  Yet there is a difference.  Private law
concepts such as duty in tort, formation and privity in contract, and the doc-
trines of equitable remedies restrain analysis by focusing on the parties’ pri-
mary duties and obligations.  On the other hand, American formalism is
designed to restrain the role of courts within the constitutional system.
Comparisons between English and American law are revealing because
the realist account of private law had far less influence in England and Com-
monwealth countries.  Though nearly all common-law jurisdictions have tran-
sitioned into more active administrative states, private law continues to play a
central role in the life of English law.  It not only dominates its traditional
sphere, but is relevant to a range of legal questions American law addresses
via statutory and procedural tools.  On the other hand, the English approach
to statutory interpretation is considerably more open-textured than Ameri-
can textualism, and does not maintain the thick procedural apparatus that
overlays so much of American civil litigation.
My argument is that these trends are related.  Judges operating in the
Anglo-American sphere face constant pressure to explain how their decisions
are different from those reached through overtly political processes.  The
the divide between legislative and common-law frameworks “addresses the organizing logic
of the legal system”).
5 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Foreword: Law in an Activist State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083,
1092–93 (1983) (“[R]ise of the activist state potentially transforms the nature of the hum-
blest suit in tort, property, or contract,” as legal energy turns toward “deepening interest in
the way statutes shape bureaucratic incentives.”); Chayes, supra note 3, at 8 (“The develop-
ment is rooted in much more pervasive changes in the contemporary . . . ways of thinking
about law and the legal system . . . .”); Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New
Public Law Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. REV. 792, 802–03 (1991) (“The growth of the adminis-
trative state and the associated . . . developments in social attitudes have brought with them
a new conception of law, and a concomitant change in judicial attitudes and methods.”).
6 See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 92 (1977) (“The law, state and
federal, was in [a] process of being reduced to statutory form with most of the significant
continuing problems being committed to administrative agencies.”); Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public
Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 888 (1991) (“[C]ommon law courts began viewing themselves
as operating in the shadow of the legislature . . . .”); Rubin, supra note 5, at 793 (“The
conceptual structure of existing [common law] legal scholarship is simply unsuited to an
analysis of the administrative state.”).
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classical answer is that law is different because it adheres to a set of conceptu-
alized principles formally applied by learned judges.  Legal analysis thus grav-
itates toward areas of law the body politic perceives as sufficiently formalized
so as to constrain judicial activity and distinguish it from the political realm.
By the same token, law will move away from areas seen as too accommodating
of social preferences, too subject to desires of the lawyerly class, and too
realist.
While realism succeeded in deconstructing private law, this success both
caused and enabled private law to become less systemically important to the
workings of American law.  As legal thought migrated to statutory and juris-
dictional concerns, these areas were theorized into formalist doctrines that
pushed legal analysis inward.  On the English side however, private law
remains relatively immune to realist critique and retains its primary status
within the legal system.  There is less need for formalized laws of statutory
interpretation and jurisdiction, and these doctrines are comparatively absent
from the English landscape.
The argument proceeds as follows: Part I showcases the gap between
how traditional questions of private law are adjudicated within each system.
Part II offers a contrast between the conceptual accounts promoted by Peter
Birks, the leading proponent of private law formalism in English law, and
American formalism grounded in statutory and procedural law, as offered by
Justice Antonin Scalia.  Parts III and IV explain how the increased formaliza-
tion of American statutory and procedural law displaced private law from the
prominent position it once held.  Part V tests the thesis out by comparing
how each system mediates the relationship between citizens and their govern-
ment.  American law addresses these questions through public, procedural,
and statutory law, while the Anglo world leans on private law to accomplish
similar ends.  Part VI then considers the implications of Erie on the allocation
of private and procedural law.  The Article concludes by explaining why the
law craves formalism.
A note on nomenclature.  As used here, formalism is an approach that
limits the range of factors relevant to legal decisions.  Formalism directs anal-
ysis inward toward authorized sources of law and away from broader moral,
social, or political considerations hovering in the background.7  It militates
against interpreting rules in light of consequences or finessing application to
better match the rule’s rationale.8  Formalism favors rules over standards,
shifting authority away from the rule-applier toward the rule-creator.
Conceptualism reinforces formalism in two ways.  First it explains why
legal analysis should be confined.  The existing legal doctrines derive from
the law’s conceptual core which preexist and stand outside the domain of
political contestation.9  Formalism vindicates the rule of law by ensuring that
7 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988).
8 Id. at 525.
9 The classic articulations are ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 1–8
(1995), and Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE
L.J. 949, 950–51 (1988).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 6 21-JAN-21 9:51
1072 notre dame law review [vol. 96:3
outcomes derive from the conceptual legal core rather than social prefer-
ences of its decisionmakers.  Second, when established doctrines do not pro-
vide a clear answer to novel legal questions, the answer can be derived by
precise reasoning from the law’s internal structure.  We can see formalism as
the process lawyers use to reach decisions, and conceptualism as the theoreti-
cal account of legal relationships articulated by academics and scholars.10
Realism takes the opposite view and argues that formalism is rarely as
determinative as its devotees assume.  Judges only appear to decide cases on
narrow legal grounds, but really make debatable value choices that are
presented to the public as inexorable legal logic.  Because decisions turn on
a broader range of considerations than formalists acknowledge, realists think
law should be more transparent and openly embrace the range of possible
outcomes.  Realist doctrine tends to emphasize the multiplicity of factors, the
value-choices, and consequences embedded in legal decisions.
Realists also deny the law has a preexisting or fixed conceptual core that
lawyers can identify and reason from.  Rather than coherence, they find the
body of caselaw merely encodes unresolved competing considerations into
legal doctrine, leaving sufficient material for each side to make reasonable
arguments from authorized sources of law.11  Rather than search for elusive
principles that do not exist, realists hold lawyers should forthrightly discuss
the factors actually influencing the law and craft doctrines that address these
factors directly.
Realist and formalist doctrines therefore work differently.  Conceptual-
ists present doctrine as a dense network of internally consistent rules that
permit a learned lawyer to reason from upper-level concepts to a specific
case.  These theories focus on identifying foundational principles and creat-
ing structured taxonomies of legal doctrine.  Moreover, because formalism
deliberately blocks common-sense and contextualist considerations, it is
prone to producing counterintuitive results.  To the formalist, this is a fea-
ture rather than a bug, however, since these intuitions are exactly what legal
doctrine is designed to preclude.
Realist law is skeptical of putting too much weight on tight taxonomic
structures.  They hold the complexity and multiplicity of legal categories pro-
duced by formalist analysis simply enables skilled advocates to manipulate the
categories toward a range of outcomes.  Realist doctrine is therefore flatter,
simpler, and more explicit about the outward-facing considerations that
underwrite legal decisions.
10 See Dan Priel, Two Forms of Formalism, in FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN THE LAW OF OBLI-
GATIONS 165, 166 (Andrew Robertson & James Goudkamp eds., 2019).  Priel distinguishes
between conceptualism and doctrinalism, noting how the former focuses on abstract prin-
ciples derived from the relationship between legal categories, while the latter on the posi-
tive output of courts. See id.  Conceptualism often provides the philosophical backing for
doctrinalism.
11 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1723–24 (1976); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private
Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 94–96 (2000).
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I. FORMALISM IN PRIVATE LAW: REALISM AND RESILIENCE
This Part highlights the differential impact of legal realism in English
and American law by contrasting leading private law cases decided by the
House of Lords/Supreme Court of the UK with parallel cases from American
jurisdictions.  Though not selected at random, the English cases are widely
seen as leading exemplars in their fields and offer a reasonable representa-
tion of how English courts analyze these matters.  The American law analysis
either relies on well-known cases or on a tradition of how the matters are
framed in litigation.
Private law in both systems retains its classical terminology and is gener-
ally unaffected by legislative interventions.  Nevertheless, clear differences
emerge.  Facts that English courts see as raising difficult questions of private
law are much less portentous in American courts where functionalist analysis
circumvents the conceptual questions gnawing at English law.
A. Contract Law: Offer and Acceptance
Assume the following facts:
Crook bounces a check or uses fake/stolen IDs and social security numbers
to obtain a car from Dealer.  Crook sells the car to BFP, (Bona Fide Pur-
chaser), an unsuspecting third party, and then disappears.  Dealer sues BFP
for return of the car.
Which innocent party bears the loss?
1. Contemporary American Caselaw
To American courts, this issue is about as interesting as the generic
description of the facts suggests.12  For decades, courts have simply applied
UCC § 2-403, at times backed up with rudimentary policy reasoning.13  Most
of these cases are litigated only because of factual uncertainties regarding
BFP’s innocence.14
12 See Sean Thomas, Mistake of Identity: A Comparative Analysis, 2008 LLOYD’S MAR. &
COM. L.Q. 188 (contrasting English and American approaches to the mistaken identity
problem; noting paucity of analytic and factual inquiry in American decisions).
13 See U.C.C. § 2-403 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); see, e.g., Charles Evans
BMW, Inc. v. Williams, 395 S.E.2d 650, 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (straightforward applica-
tion of UCC § 2-403); Dartmouth Motor Sales, Inc. v. Wilcox, 517 A.2d 804, 806 (N.H.
1986) (litigating straightforward application of UCC § 2-403 on Crook’s noncompliance
with vehicle registration statutes); see also Stein v. Geico Indem. Ins., 658 S.E.2d 153,
155–56 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Tavoulareas v. Steven Kessler Motor Cars, Inc., 686 N.Y.S.2d
17, 17 (App. Div. 1999).  For more examples, see 3 RICHARD W.  DUESENBERG ET AL., SALES
AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODES § 10.05, LexisNexis
(updated 2020); 1 JAMES J. WHITE, ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 4:33 (6th ed. 2020).
14 See, e.g., Christina L. Kunz, Motor Vehicle Ownership Disputes Involving Certificate-of-Title
Acts and Article Two of the U.C.C., 39 BUS. LAW. 1599, 1600 (1984) (finding inconsistent
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2. English Caselaw
English courts approach this question with far greater solemnity.15  One
Lord noted how it is a “difficult problem”; another how “[g]enerations of law
students have struggled with” it,16 and a third, how it “has bemused courts
and commentators alike for over 150 years.”17
What makes this so complicated?18  A basic proposition of offer and
acceptance law holds that Dealer’s offer to X can be accepted only by X.  But
what if Crook uses fake or stolen documents to fool Dealer into thinking that
Crook is X—an unknown victim of identity theft?  Here English law employs
a basic syllogism: (1) because Dealer does not intend to contract with Crook,
the contract fails for lack of mutuality; (2) since no contract is created, title
cannot pass to Crook; and finally (3), since Crook does not bear title, he
cannot pass it onward to BFP.  As a result, BFP must absorb the loss and
return the car to Dealer.
But here is the catch.  Crook lacks title only when the parties communi-
cate in writing.  But if the parties meet face-to-face, the law assumes Dealer
“intends” to sell the car to the person standing in the showroom before him.
Since the contract is valid, title passes to Crook who can then pass it on to
BFP.  BFP is then entitled to retain the car.
The issue raised to the House of Lords in Shogun Finance is that Crook
both misrepresented himself face-to-face and used stolen/fake documents to
perpetrate the fraud.19  This blend of documentary and in-person fraud
sowed confusion as to the relevant inquiry.  Should the law address the more
realist/consequentialist question of who gets the car, or the more formalist
questions of whether title passed, whether the communications between
Crook and Dealer were “really” made in person or in writing, or whether
Dealer “intended” to sell the car to Crook?  Each approach got the vote of at
least one English judge, leaving this area of law in a “sorry condition” and
results where state-specific motor vehicle statutes and UCC potentially conflict); see also
West v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037, 1040–46 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (framing case as a contest
between the UCC and nineteenth-century “stolen property statute[s],” which suggest that a
thief could not pass title to stolen goods).
15 See Shogun Fin. Ltd. v. Hudson [2003] UKHL 62, [2004] 1 AC (HL) 919 (appeal
taken from Eng.); Shogun Fin. Ltd. v. Hudson [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1000, [2002] QB 834
[13] (Eng.).
16 Shogun Fin. [2004] 1 AC at [1] (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead); id. at [57] (Lord
Millett) (noting struggles faced by generations of law students).
17 Id. at [111] (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers).
18 See id. at [183] (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe) (questioning the intricacies of offer
and acceptance law).
19 Shogun Fin. [2002] QB at [3] (Lord Sedley).
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tied in a “Gordian knot.”20  In a 3–2 ruling, the House of Lords reaffirmed
the traditional view and left the BFP in this case holding the bag.21
3. American Law Through the Twentieth Century
The formalistic distinction between fraud committed face-to-face versus
in writing reflects an older American tradition tracing its origin to an 1883
decision by the Massachusetts high court.22  But in time, American courts
became less comfortable with a doctrine that turned on the mode of trickery
20 Id. at [51] (Lord Brooke); id. at [23] (Lord Sedley).  Lower courts entertained sev-
eral alternative framings including focusing on relationship between dealer and finance
company and the precise wording of the purported contract. See id. at [40]–[42] (Lord
Dyson).
21 Shogun Fin. [2004] 1 AC at [193] (Lord Walker).  Though Shogun turned on
whether Crook is considered a “debtor” under the Hire Purchase Act of 1964, the court
held this was dependent on whether Dealer and Crook concluded a contract pursuant to
traditional common-law principles. See id. at [12]–[16].  The approach favored by the two
dissenting Lords had scholarly champions who advocated that England adopt the UCC’s
approach. See Thomas, supra note 12, at 188–213.
22 See Phillips v. Brooks, Ltd. [1919] 2 KB 243 at 246 (Eng.) (“The headnote in
[Edmunds] contains two propositions, which I think adequately express my view of the law.”
(citing Edmunds v. Merch.’s Dispatch Transp. Co., 135 Mass. 283 (1883))). See, e.g., Mer-
cantile Nat’l Bank of the City of N.Y. v. Silverman, 132 N.Y.S. 1017, 1019 (App. Div. 1911)
(“The primary question . . . is whether . . . the appellant intended to make the individual
with whom he had the correspondence the payee . . . .”), aff’d per curiam, 104 N.E. 1134
(N.Y. 1914); Rodliff v. Dallinger, 4 N.E. 805, 807 (Mass. 1886) (Holmes, J.) (reasoning that
whether contract is void or voidable turns on the intent of initial seller); see also SAMUEL
WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNI-
FORM SALES ACT § 635 (1909); 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS
AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT § 635 (2d. ed. 1924); 2 SAMUEL WIL-
LISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM
SALES ACT §§ 336–48 (rev. ed. 1948) [hereinafter WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS 1948]; 1
SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 69 nn.15–16 (rev. ed. 1924) (collecting
cases).
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employed by Crook.23  Legal realists reframed the issue as a policy choice
between the defrauded Dealer and the innocent BFP.24
This move was part of a broader realist assault on the concept of “title to
chattels.”  Karl Llewellyn and Grant Gilmore—principal drafters of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC)—led the charge.  Llewellyn held title to chat-
tels was a “mythical” or even “mystical” construct, and chided formalists who
thought that title was something whose “location . . . [was] determinable with
certainty.”25  Likewise, in his celebrated article The Commercial Doctrine of Good
Faith Purchase,26 Gilmore explained how in contests between Dealers and
BFP’s the law was moving away from formal analysis of property rights toward
functional concerns:
[C]ourts were finding new ways to shift distribution risks.  Their happiest
discovery was the concept of “voidable title”—a vague idea . . . whose great-
est virtue . . . may well have been its shapeless imprecision . . . .
The ingenious distinction between “no title” . . . (therefore true owner
prevails over [BFP]) and “voidable title” . . . (therefore true owner loses to
[BFP]) made it possible to throw the risk on the true owner in the typical
commercial situation while protecting him in the noncommercial one.27
23 See Clarence D. Ashley, Mutual Assent in Contract, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 71, 74–76 (1903)
(disagreeing with the House of Lords in Cundy v. Lindsay, and arguing that the contract is
binding since the seller intends to contract with the writer of the forged documents (citing
Cundy v. Lindsay [1878] 38 LT 573 (HL))); see also Note, Assent to Contract Under Mistake as
to Offeror’s Identity, 16 HARV. L. REV. 381, 381 (1903) (disagreeing with Cundy, and arguing
mistaken identity transactions create voidable title); Note, Effect of Mistake of Person, Misrep-
resentation of Person and Impersonation in Crimes, Contracts and Negotiable Instruments, 68 U. PA.
L. REV. 387, 387–88 (1920) (analyzing cases); L. Vold, Fraud on the Seller, 3 DAKOTA L. REV.
299, 300–01 (1931) (presaging UCC approach and noting the incoherence of the face-to-
face versus writing distinction); Charles B. Collins, Title to Goods Paid for with Worthless Check,
15 S. CAL. L. REV. 340, 340–41 (1942); Calvin W. Corman, Cash Sales, Worthless Checks and
the Bona Fide Purchaser, 10 VAND. L REV. 55, 55–57 (1956); William D. Warren, Cutting off
Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 477 (1963)
(using classic realist rhetoric to critique courts distinguishing outcomes based on the
method of fraud). But see Note, The Owner’s Intent and the Negotiability of Chattels: A Critique
of Section 2-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 YALE L.J. 1205, 1225–26 (1963) (favoring
the English position).
24 See, e.g., Stanton Motor Corp. v. Rosetti, 203 N.Y.S.2d 273, 275–76 (App. Div. 1960)
(finding for BFP by noting the policy issues in play as between the two innocent parties);
Dudley v. Lovins, 220 S.W.2d 978, 980 (Ky. 1949) (same).
25 K.N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 159,
165–66 (1938); see U.C.C. § 2-401 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).  For a discussion
on Llewellyn and the Code’s conception of “title” and “property,” see Jeanne L. Schroeder,
Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed “Property,” 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1281,
1282, 1339–41 (1996).
26 Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057
(1954).
27 Id. at 59–60.  Williston however, continued to support the face-to-face versus writing
distinction. See 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1517 (1920); 1 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1517 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d. ed.
1957); see also WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS 1948, supra note 22, §§ 343, 346(a); 3 SAMUEL
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This theoretical assault on traditional title and offer/acceptance doc-
trine became the consensus American view now reflected in both the UCC
and common law.28
B. Unjust Enrichment/Property Law
While differences between Anglo and American law are found across the
private law spectrum, some of the largest gaps exist at the intersection of
unjust enrichment and property law.29
1. Contemporary Anglo Law
In the House of Lords decision Foskett v. McKeown,30 Murphy embezzled
his client’s funds and used these monies to pay some of his life insurance
premiums.31 When Murphy later committed suicide, his victims argued they
could trace their stolen funds into the insurance premiums and were there-
fore entitled to a proportional share of the insurance proceeds.32  Murphy’s
heirs countered that victims could recover no more than the nominal
amounts paid into the policy from stolen funds.33
Foskett occasioned a lengthy disquisition into the conceptual underpin-
nings of contract, property, and restitution law with the aim of locating the
precise interests of each party across the transactional chain.  This occa-
sioned intricate analysis of tracing, following, and claiming law; the legal rela-
tionship between a bank and its account holder; and the nature of rights in
an unmatured life insurance policy.34  Sensing this excursion a bit over-
wrought, Lord Millett appealed to conceptual coherence, stating: “It is, of
WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNI-
FORM SALES ACT SALES OF GOODS §§ 635–636 (rev. ed. 1948).
28 See Pingleton v. Shepherd, 242 S.W.2d 971, 972 (Ark. 1951) (since seller’s voidable
title was not voided, BFP acquired valid title); Ross v. Leuci, 85 N.Y.S.2d 497, 501 (City Ct.
1949) (though consent obtained by fraud, fraudster obtained voidable title which he
passed to the bona fide purchaser); Dudley, 220 S.W.2d at 980 (buyer vested with a voidable
title and passed title on to BFP even though sellers were mistaken as to buyer’s identity and
check was not honored); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 153 cmt. g, illus. 11–13 (AM.
L. INST. 1981) (noting “[m]istakes as to the identity of a party ha[s] sometimes been
treated as [a] distinct” category of mistake, “but the modern trend is to apply” general
rules of mistake); see also Rolf B. Johnson, A Uniform Solution to Common Law Confusion:
Retention of Title Under English and U.S. Law, 12 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 99, 129 (1994)
(contrasting the categoric English approach with the more flexible approach under the
UCC).
29 See Chaim Saiman, Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the Global Restitu-
tion Party, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 103–04 (2008) [hereinafter Saiman, Restitution in
America]; Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal Doctrine, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 993, 994 (2008) [hereinafter Saiman, Restitution and Legal Doctrine].
30 [2001] 1 AC 102 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
31 See id. at 107–08 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 Id. at 133–34 (Lord Millett).
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course, always open to the parties in any case to dispense with complex calcu-
lations and agree upon a simpler method of apportionment.  But . . . [there
exist] an enormous variety of financial instruments.  For present purposes
they form a seamless web.”35  Lord Browne-Wilkinson similarly underscored
this was a “case of hard-nosed property rights,”36 where considerations of fair-
ness cannot interfere with the result mandated by law.37
2. Contemporary American Law
Unlike the House of Lords, the Mississippi Supreme Court took only a
few paragraphs to explain that when life insurance is purchased with embez-
zled funds, the burden shifts to the heirs to show the policy was not purchased
with stolen assets.38  This court does not consult academic scholarship,
Roman law, or engage in historical or theoretical accounts of property and
restitution.  It simply asserts the court must impose a constructive trust on the
insurance proceeds because “neither equity nor the law” permits a thief to
take credit for payments at the expense of innocent victims.39  The case
makes no effort to defend this allocation through the operative legal princi-
ples, but instead concludes with a rough-justice compromise.
3. American Law Through the Twentith Century
Notwithstanding the Mississippi decision, earlier American reports con-
tain numerous cases wrangling with how to account for stolen monies paid
into insurance policies—indeed many are cited by the House of Lords in
Foskett.40  This question used to receive considerable attention from the legal
academy, including: Samuel Williston’s The Right to Follow Trust Property when
Confused with Other Property (Harvard Law Review 1888); James Barr Ames’s
Following Misappropriated Property into Its Product (Harvard Law Review 1906);
and a comment, Rights of a Dependent Beneficiary Under Insurance Policies Pro-
35 Id. at 145.
36 Id. at 109 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
37 Id.
38 Lackey v. Lackey, 691 So. 2d 990, 993 (Miss. 1997).
39 Id. at 995 (quoting Brown v. N.Y. Life Ins., 152 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir. 1945)).
40 See Foskett [2001] 1 AC at 103, 135; Lohman v. Gen. Am. Life Ins., 478 F.2d 719, 721
(8th Cir. 1973); Vorlander v. Keyes, 1 F.2d 67, 68 (8th Cir. 1924); Baxter House, Inc. v.
Rosen, 278 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443–44 (App. Div. 1967); Truelsch v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins., 202 N.W.
352, 354 (Wis. 1925); Holmes v. Gilman, 34 N.E. 205, 205 (N.Y. 1893); Shaler v. Trow-
bridge, 28 N.J. Eq. 595, 596, 601–05 (N.J. 1887); see also 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM
FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 29.1.9 (5th ed.
2008) (collecting cases).
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cured with Misappropriated Funds (Yale Law Journal 1925)41—all cited in
Foskett.42
As the twentieth century wore on the interest in formal common-law
logic that propels these inquiries receded.  Only a smattering of recent
cases—or scholarship in leading journals—engage these issues in detail,43
while leading treatises remain essentially unchanged from editions published
just around the Second World War.44  Though the legal issue is no more
resolved today than a century ago, the conceptual account of private law ani-
mating these decisions faded.45
41 See Samuel Williston, The Right to Follow Trust Property When Confused with Other Prop-
erty, 2 HARV. L. REV. 28, 28 (1888); James Barr Ames, Following Misappropriated Property into
Its Product, 19 HARV. L. REV. 511, 511–12 (1906); Comment, Rights of a Dependent Beneficiary
Under Insurance Policies Procured with Misappropriated Funds, 35 YALE L.J. 220, 220–27 (1925).
42 Foskett [2001] 1 AC at 130–31, 134.  Other scholarship on this topic from that era
includes comments and notes published at James F. Kelly, Note, Following Misappropriated
Funds into Life Insurance Policies, 4 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 239, 239 (1930); Decisions, 5 BROOK.
L. REV. 474, 474–76 (1936); Miscellany, 12 VA. L. REG. 375, 380–82 (1926); Recent Cases,
59 HARV. L. REV. 459, 462–63 (1946); Recent Cases, 9 MINN. L. REV. 470, 490–91 (1924);
Recent Cases, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 913–14 (1936); Recent Decisions, 31 MICH. L. REV.
841, 869–70 (1933).
43 None of the recent cases engage in serious inquiry into the issues raised in Foskett.
See In re McLain, 516 F.3d 301, 311–16 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying Texas law) (dealing with
bankruptcy matters); N.Y. Life Ins. v. Waxenberg, No. 07-cv-401-T-27, 2009 WL 632896, at
*3–5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2009) (dealing with attorneys’ fees and procedural questions);
Paschal v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 215 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Tex. App. 2006) (dealing with
factual questions and admissibility of expert witnesses); Marineau v. Gen. Am. Life Ins., 898
S.W.2d 397, 401 (Tex. App. 1995) (cursory analysis of issue); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 58 illus. 4, 12 (AM. L. INST. 2011) (eliding the
conceptual issues of Foskett, as the matter is to the equitable “discretion of the court”).  The
same trend is found in scholarship. See Dale A. Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary
Right to Trace Misappropriated Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 172,
172–73 (1983); Claire Seaton Rosa, Note, Should Owners Have to Share?  An Examination of
Forced Sharing in the Name of Fairness in Recent Multiple Fraud Victim Cases, 90 B.U. L. REV.
1331, 1336 (2010).
44 See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 925 (rev. 2d ed. repl. vol. 1995) (referencing only one case past 1950); 5 AUS-
TIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 508.4, 516.1
(4th ed. 1989) (showing that the overwhelming percentage of cases cited on issue are pre-
1950); see also GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 74:37–38, Westlaw (database
updated June 2020) (one case after 1951); Annotation, Right with Respect to Proceeds of Life
Insurance of One Whose Funds Have Been Wrongfully Used to Pay Premiums, 24 A.L.R.2d §§ 1–5,
Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2020) (showing an overwhelming percentage of cases dis-
cussing this issue are from 1880–1950); 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1968, Westlaw (database
updated June 2020) (same).
45 See Lackey v. Lackey, 691 So. 2d 990, 993–96 (Miss. 1997) (citing conflicting cases
and reaching an equitable compromise on the matter); SCOTT ET AL., supra note 40,
§§ 508.4, 516.1 (debating as to whether victims of embezzlement can claim pro-rata share
in insurance payout).
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C. Equity
Several themes emerging from the property/unjust enrichment context
reprise when considering equity, or what American lawyers call “remedies.”
Indeed, whether to think of this area as “remedial” discretionary practices or
a structured taxonomy of “rules of equity” is a core difference between Anglo
and American legal cultures.46
1. The Freewheeling Constructive Trusts of American Law
The American law of constructive trusts offers a notoriously broad rem-
edy to correct misappropriation, embezzlement, wrongdoing, and general
unfairness.47  As far back as 1919, Justice Cardozo famously announced: “A
constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds
expression . . . [which offers] no unyielding formula.  The equity of the trans-
action must shape the measure of [the] relief.”48  Following Cardozo’s lead,
courts used the constructive trust (and its equitable cousins), to remediate
“any form of legal or equitable wrong.”49
American courts grant constructive trusts even absent a showing of fraud
or misrepresentation,50 and do not generally require prior relationship
between the constructive trustee and the victim.51  The primary limitation on
this remedy is found in the bankruptcy context, where the contest is not
between the wrongdoer and the victim, but between the victim and the
46 See Saiman, Restitution and Legal Doctrine, supra note 29, 994–99.
47 The most nuanced American treatment are found in: HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW
AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 297–327 (2004); Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Recla-
mation and Constructive Trust, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 265, 277–84 (1998); Emily L. Sherwin,
Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 297, 313.
48 Beatty v. Guggenheim Expl. Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380–81 (N.Y. 1919); see also H. Jeffer-
son Powell, “Cardozo’s Foot”: The Chancellor’s Conscience and Constructive Trusts, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Spring 1993, at 7, 15–16 (noting Beatty reflects the classic articulation of
American constructive trust law).
49 See GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.3, at 100 (1978 & Supp. 2008).
A concise listing of uses is outlined in Andrew Kull, Deconstructing the Constructive Trust, 40
CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 358, 361 (2004). See In re Estate of Savich, 671 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2003) (“A constructive trust is not limited to situations involving fraud or other
wrongdoing, but may be imposed when there is clear and convincing evidence that it
would be ‘morally wrong for the property holder to retain’ the property.” (quoting Estate
of Spiess v. Schumm, 448 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989))); Jaser v. Fischer, 783
A.2d 28, 35 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (reasoning that a constructive trust can arise under
almost any situation where a party “obtained or holds the legal right to property which he
ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy” (quoting Spatola v. Spatola, 492
A.2d 518, 520 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985))).
50 See PALMER, supra note 49, § 1.3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 55 reporters’ note cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2011); see also Constructive Trust,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“Despite its name, [a constructive trust] is not a
trust at all” but is “[a]n equitable remedy that a court imposes against one who has
obtained property by wrongdoing.”); Constructive Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014) (“[T]he device does not create a ‘trust’ in any usual sense of that word.”).
51 See PALMER, supra note 49, §§ 1.3, 15a, at 94 (citing cases).
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wrongdoer’s other victims or creditors.52  Dan Dobbs, arguably the most
mainstream American remedies scholar of the late twentieth century, high-
lighted the influence of legal realism in this area, noting “[c]onstructive trust
is the name we give to [the] decision, not the reason for it.”53  He cautioned
against taking the trust terminology too seriously, because it “stand[s in] for
one or more of the potential effects, but the term has no mystical
significance.”54
2. The Conceptualized Constructive Trusts of English Law
English constructive trust law is more confined,55 and the differences
illuminate the broader jurisprudential debate about the nature of private law
reasoning.  The realist-inspired American version assumes constructive trusts
are remedies imposed by courts to reverse wrongdoing.  Doctrinally, this
means less insistence that the remedy perfectly correlate with the violated
right and that trial court awards of constructive trust are reviewed under def-
erential “abuse of discretion” standards rather than the more searching de
novo review that attends to questions of law.56  The prevailing English view
rejects that constructive trusts are court-fashioned remedies, but holds they
arise by operation of law in response to correlative violations of the victim’s
property rights.57  English law therefore subdivides constructive trusts into
52 See Poss v. Morris (In re Morris), 260 F.3d 654, 666–68 (6th Cir. 2001); Kitchen v.
Boyd (In re Newpower), 233 F.3d 922, 931 (6th Cir. 2000); Lindsey v. O’Brien, Tanski,
Tanzer & Young Health Care Providers of Conn. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 86 F.3d 482,
494–95 (6th Cir. 1996); XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Grp., Inc.), 16 F.3d
1443, 1448 (6th Cir. 1994); DAGAN, supra note 47, at 299–302; Kull, supra note 47, at 265;
Sherwin, supra note 47, at 315–16; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 58 (AM. L. INST. 2011).
53 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES–REMEDIES–RESTITUTION § 4.3, at 398 (2d
ed. 1993).
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., J.D. HEYDON & M.J. LEEMING, JACOBS’ LAW OF TRUSTS IN AUSTRALIA 238 (8th
ed. 2016) (observing that, in the United States, “the term ‘constructive trust’ is more
loosely used than has been the case in England and Australia”).
56 See United States v. Andrews, 530 F.3d 1232, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008) (reviewing
“imposition of a constructive trust” under an “abuse of discretion” standard”); Am. Metal
Forming Corp. v. Pittman, 52 F.3d 504, 508 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); David Welch Co. v.
Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 345 (Ct. App. 1988) (same); United States v. Andrews,
530 F.3d 1232, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008) (same).
57 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council
[1996] AC 669 (HL) at 714–15 (appeal taken from Eng.); Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. v.
Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. [1981] 1 Ch. 105 at 124 (Eng.) (rights and remedies are
“indissolubly connected” and the distinction between them is “idle”); see also ROBERT CHAM-
BERS, RESULTING TRUSTS 3 (reprt. 2006) (1997); Peter Birks, The End of the Remedial Con-
structive Trust?, 12 TRUST L. INT’L 202 (1998); Lord P.J. Millett, Restitution and Constructive
Trusts, 114 LAW Q. REV. 399, 399–400 (1998); Charlie Webb, The Myth of the Remedial Con-
structive Trust, 69 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 353, 355 (2016).  For Anglo critiques of this ortho-
doxy, see CRAIG ROTHERHAM, PROPRIETARY REMEDIES IN CONTEXT 27–31 (2002); Simon
Evans, Defending Discretionary Remedialism, 23 SYDNEY L. REV. 463, 463, 500 (2001); Simon
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the institutional (also called substantive/resulting/implied) constructive
trusts, which arise as a matter of law, and “American style” or “remedial” con-
structive trusts that do not.58
Though some Commonwealth courts have moved in the American direc-
tion,59 the UK Supreme Court expressly disavowed these developments,
explaining that “[p]roperty rights are fixed and ascertainable rights,” and
“[w]hether they exist . . . depends on settled principles, even in equity.”60
English law has therefore “not recognised the remedial constructive trust
favoured in . . . the United States.”61
D. Tort
1. Duty Analysis in American Law
Starting in the late 1950s and ’60s, California courts held that lawyers
and other professionals could be liable to nonclients despite the lack of con-
tractual privity between them. Biakanja v. Irving involved a suit against a
notary who produced a will deemed invalid for want of attestation.62  The
decision is generally devoid of theorizing on the nature of legal liability, and
rests on the realist view that “privity is a matter of policy and involves the
balancing of various factors.”63  A follow-up case discussed a will drafted by a
lawyer that failed to comply with the rule against perpetuities.64  Since the
Gardner, The Element of Discretion, in 2 THE FRONTIERS OF LIABILITY 186, 197–203 (P.B.H.
Birks ed., 1994); Darryn M. Jensen, The Rights and Wrongs of Discretionary Remedialism, 2003
SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 178, 180; Donavan W.M. Waters, Liability and Remedy: An Adjusta-
ble Relationship, 64 SASK. L. REV. 429, 447–53 (2001).
58 Westdeutsche [1996] AC at 714–15.  These categories were first articulated by Roscoe
Pound, but have failed to gain traction in the American discourse. See Roscoe Pound, The
Progress of Law, 1918–1919 Equity, 33 HARV. L. REV. 420, 422–23 (1920).  On occasion,
American courts will discuss differences between constructive and resulting trusts. See, e.g.,
Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Valente (In re Valente), 360 F.3d 256, 261–62 (1st Cir. 2004); Markgraf
v. Welker, 873 N.W.2d 26, 34 (N.D. 2015); In re Estate of Abernathy, 778 So. 2d 123,
127–28 (Miss. 2001).  But the distinctions are often muddled together. See, e.g., Nichols v.
Nichols (In re Estate of Nichols), 856 S.W.2d 397, 401–03 (Tenn. 1993) (merging stan-
dards); see also Kull, supra note 47, at 359–61.
59 See, e.g., Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 219 (Can.); Grimaldi v Chame-
leon Mining NL (No. 2) [2012] 200 FCR 296 (Austl.); Elders Pastoral Ltd. v. Bank of N.Z.
[1989] 2 NZLR 180 (CA) (N.Z.); Kelly v. Cahill [2001] 1 IR 56, 62 (H. Ct.) (Ir.).  For a
review of English law with comparisons to Canadian and Australian law, see Ying Khai
Liew, Reanalysing Institutional and Remedial Constructive Trusts, 75 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 528,
540–44 (2016).
60 Bailey v. Angove’s PTY Ltd. [2016] UKSC 47, [28].
61 Id. at [27]; see also FHR Eur. Ventures LLP v. Cedar Cap. Partners LLC [2014]
UKSC 45, [47] (remedial constructive trusts have “authoritatively been said not to be part
of English law”).
62 Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 17 (Cal. 1958).
63 Id. at 19.
64 See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 686 (Cal. 1961).
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purpose of a will is to benefit third parties, the court held that “as a matter of
policy, [the putative heirs can] recover as third-party beneficiaries.”65
Neither case attempts to justify its result in terms of the theoretical
underpinnings of private law, or whether the claims are best classified as a
contract or tort.  When later forced to confront the matter, the California
court nonchalantly stated that it could be either.66
2. Duty Analysis in Contemporary English Law
A similar issue came before the House of Lords in the late 1990s.  Law-
yers had followed client instructions to draft a will dispossessing the client’s
daughters.67  The family later reconciled, and lawyers were instructed to pre-
pare a new will.68  The lawyers negligently delayed and the testator died with
the old will in force.69  The daughters sued the lawyers claiming the inheri-
tance they were due under the should-have-been revised will.70
 Because the case did not neatly fit into either contract or tort concepts, the
lead opinion is structured as a balancing act between the “impulse to do prac-
tical justice” (favoring plaintiffs) and the “conceptual difficulties” raised by
accommodating liability within ordinary private law principles.71  As a matter
of contract law, the heirs were third-party beneficiaries and not in contractual
privity with the lawyers.72  From the tort side, omissions are not generally
actionable.73  Nevertheless, the “impulse to do practical justice” pushed the
House of Lords to extend its line of professional liability cases,74 and hold
that the duty owed to the client could extend to intended beneficiaries.75
3. Trends in Twentieth Century American Tort Law
Traditionally, both English and American law precluded claims for want
of privity of contract or duty in tort.  Realist thinking, however, chipped away
at these requirements,76 and mainstream American law stopped taking the
65 See id. at 689 (in dicta).
66 See Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 163–64 (Cal. 1969) (noting that applying Biakanja
criteria in a contractual setting leads to both contract and tort causes of action).  Much the
same was true in the insurance bad-faith context. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins., 328
P.2d 198, 202–03 (Cal. 1958) (observing that insurance bad-faith action can arise in either
contract or tort); see also Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173, 178–79
(Cal. 1967) (same).
67 See White v. Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 (HL) at 216–19 (Lord Nicholls).
68 Id. at 217.
69 Id. at 217–18.
70 Id. at 218.
71 Id. at 255, 259 (Lord Goff of Chieveley) (emphasis omitted).
72 Id. at 266.
73 Id. at 267–69.
74 Id. at 259, 262.
75 See id. at 268–269.
76 See WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED TOPICS
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380, 394–402 (1953) [hereinafter PROSSER, Borderland] (collecting
cases).
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idea of “duty” seriously altogether.  By the 1950s, the peregrinations of duty
analysis were presented to first-year law students as the parade example of
common law’s conceptual and doctrinal malleability.77
This line of critique ran from Holmes,78 to Francis Bohlen,79 Leon
Green,80 and Cardozo,81 and eventually crystallized in William Prosser’s
midcentury treatise, destined to become the leading authority of the era.82
Prosser explained:
The statement that there is or is not a duty [of care] . . . is a shorthand
statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself. . . .
“[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection.83
Prosser’s realist-inspired account describes duty as an empty vessel whose
primary justification is that “[i]t is embedded far too firmly in our law to be
discarded.”84  On Prosser’s reading, defendant’s “no duty” claim typically
fails, and tort law transitioned from a conceptual analysis to a policy judg-
ment about the boundaries of liability.85
Though the pendulum has swung back in recent decades, traditional
limitations on tort recovery can still be understood as “historical anomalies”
that had become “‘outmoded’ or obsolete,”86 requiring courts to clear away
77 See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 12–19 (1949).
78 See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 75–76, 105–08 (Boston, Little, Brown
& Co. 1881); The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 652 (1873) (unsigned article written by
Oliver W. Holmes); see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of Mac-
Pherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1753–56 (1998).
79 See Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53 AM. L.
REG. 209, 209 (1905).
80 See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (pts. 1 & 2), 28 COLUM. L. REV.
1014, 1033–44 (1928), 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929).
81 See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation,
15 GA. L. REV. 925, 937–38 (1981). But see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 78, at 1766–70.
82 For the traditional account, see LEVI, supra note 77, at 7–19; PROSSER, Borderland,
supra note 76 at 391–400; G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY 137–79 (rev. ed. 2003); and Rabin, supra note 81, at 925–28, 950–54.  But see
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 78, at 1746 n.45 (arguing that Cardozo believes in a rela-
tional account of duty rather than the public policy conception conventionally attributed
to him).
83 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (3d ed. 1964).  This is
quoted and critiqued in Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 78, at 1763.  This stance contin-
ues in more recent law.  See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT
LAW: AN ANALYTICAL PRIMER ON CASES AND CONCEPTS 225 (1997), which is critiqued in
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 78, at 1770–71.
84 PROSSER, supra note 83, § 53.
85 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 78, at 1752–66 (outlining and critiquing the
“Holmes-Prosser” assault on duty).
86 Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort
Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 608 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartz, Beginning and Possible End]
(footnote omitted) (quoting Robert E. Keeton, Comment, 21 VAND. L. REV. 906, 915
(1968)) (noting that the rise of mid-twentieth century tort law was arrested in 1980).  Stan-
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“various encumbrances operating on tort law.”87  It became commonplace to
discount privity and duty requirements in academic circles, pointing to the
malleability of “special relationships,”88 and to the distinction between
actionable misfeasance and non-nonfeasance.89
E. Interim Summary
Though we have examined four areas, substantially parallel narratives
emerge across a range of substantive private law issues, including: rise of
promissory estoppel and section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts;90 products
liability under section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts;91 availability of
remedies for third-party beneficiaries in contract;92 expansion of vicarious
liability concepts in tort;93 and continuing relevance of the law/equity
distinction.94
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, across the
Atlantic divide private law was understood as “general commercial law,”95
with a similar doctrinal architecture that was largely independent of which
dard accounts include: WHITE, supra note 82, at 63–113 (describing how tort liability
expanded over the twentieth century); Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the
Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963, 965–67 (1981) (describing the rapid rise of mid-
twentieth century tort law, with a special emphasis on California courts).
87 Schwartz, Beginning and Possible End, supra note 86, at 610.
88 A complete history can be found in JAY M. FEINMAN, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY TO
THIRD PARTIES 11–27 (2d ed. 2007).
89 See Fleming James, Jr., Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 NW. U. L. REV. 778, 797
n.107 (1953); see also PROSSER, Borderland, supra note 76, at 387–422.
90 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678,
716–718 (1984).
91 See Jane Stapleton, Benefits of Comparative Tort Reasoning: Lost in Translation, J. TORT
L., no. 3, 2007, at 1, 17 (“[T]he judge-made law of torts in England and Wales . . . did not
develop analogues of the tort set out in § 402A of the Second Restatement . . . .”).
92 It took parliamentary legislation for English law to arrive at the American rule
allowing certain third-party beneficiaries to enforce the contract against a breaching party.
See Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31, § 1 (Gr. Brit.).
93 On the American expansion, see PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70
(W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton & David G. Owen eds., 5th ed. 1984);
William O. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk I, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 585
(1929); Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161, 164–73 (1954); Alan O.
Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1231–32 (1984).  On Common-
wealth reactions, see PAULA GILIKER, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN TORT: A COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVE 196–222 (2010); Claire McIvor, The Use and Abuse of the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability, 35
COMMON L. WORLD REV. 268, 268 (2006); Marianne Tutin, Note, Vicarious Liability: An Ever
Expanding Concept?, 45 INDUS. L.J. 556, 556–64 (2016).
94 See Andrew Burrows, We Do This at Common Law But That in Equity, 22 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–5 (2002); James Edelman & Simone Degeling, Fusion: The Interaction of
Common Law and Equity, 25 AUSTRALIAN BAR REV. 195 (2004); Michael Kirby, Equity’s Austra-
lian Isolationism, 8 QUEENSL. U. TECH. L. & JUST. J. 444, 467–69 (2008).
95 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842); see also Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149
U.S. 368, 379 (1893) (referencing “general rules of the common law”).
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jurisdiction articulated it.96  American casebooks relied on English cases pre-
cisely because they were not “foreign law” or even “English law,” so much as
the prime exemplar of the transjurisdictional common law.97  Holmes profit-
ably corresponded with Pollock,98 Cardozo was revered on both continents,99
and the common law was deemed the patrimony of English-speaking
peoples.100
In the standard history, as realist-inspired lawyers came to see private law
as another form of state-based regulation, they shifted from internalist
accounts toward instrumentalist ones.101  While realists generally favored
expanding the liability horizon, private-law instrumentalism can be used to
conservative ends (classical law and economics) just as much as for avowedly
redistributionist purposes.102  The divergence is less about policy goals than
about the nature of private law adjudication itself.103
96 See, e.g., N. Assurance Co. of London v. Grand View Bldg. Ass’n, 183 U.S. 308,
317–24 (1902) (reviewing English and Canadian holdings on contract interpretation in the
context of interpreting an insurance policy under American law); see also EDWARD A. PUR-
CELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 69–72 (1992) (observing that Northern Assurance reflected the juris-
prudential assumptions of the era).
97 For some early twentieth-century examples, see State v. Wilson, 161 S.E. 104, 110
(S.C. 1931) (“While the common law of England is of force in this state . . . [courts] are not
bound by the decisions of the courts of England, for ‘We have a right to take our own view
of the Common Law.’” (quoting Shecut v. McDowel, 6 S.C.L. (1 Tread.) 35, 38 (S.C. Const.
App. Ct. 1812))); Ingram v. Fred, 210 S.W. 298, 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) (“The decisions
of the English courts are not conclusive proof of what the common law of England really is,
although they are entitled to great weight.”).
98 See 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND
SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874–1932 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941).
99 See Note, 54 LAW Q. REV. 491, 493 (1938) (“[I]n his life and . . . work Justice Car-
dozo represented so nobly these great ideals of Anglo-American justice that he will be
welcomed into the goodly company of Coke and Mansfield, Marshall and Holmes.”).
100 See Priel, supra note 1, at 610–18.
101 See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 625 (2004) (Jules Coleman, Scott Shapiro &
Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2004) (exemplifying instrumentalist theories holding that pri-
vate law is “a regulatory enterprise of the state”).
102 See John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1640, 1641–48 (2012) (describing American tradition of private law skepticism that
embraces scholars of many generations and political leanings).  Dan Priel understands that
American law is grounded on democratic ideals that embody the customs and will of the
contemporary majority and are thus more open to social science and instrumentalist logic.
Anglo law is more attracted to philosophical accounts of corrective justice that closely
examine the duties, rights, powers, and remedies owed to each party, as well as Edward
Coke’s claim that law is based on “artificial reason” understood only by lawyers immersed
in the logic of the cases. See Priel, supra note 1, at 624–37; see also infra text surrounding
notes 113–28 (discussing Peter Birks).
103 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Property Along the Tort Spectrum: Trespass to Chattels and
the Anglo-American Doctrinal Divergence, 35 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 135, 161–63 (2006)
(explaining that a more essentialist Anglo approach has an easier time expanding liability
for internet torts than American consequentialist views); see also Ralf Michaels, Of Islands
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Moreover, American decisions are not always more expansive,104 or
more realist.  In the vastness of each system, numerous counterexamples are
easily located, and the expansionism of American private law has receded
from its high-water mark.105  Moreover, the divergence is probably greater in
matters of equity, trusts, and restitution106 than in either contracts or torts;
and even within contract law, more prevalent in offer and acceptance law
than in the parol evidence rule.107
Nevertheless, even formalist expressions of American private law are
often grounded on realist assumptions about what the law is,108 and overall
comparison shows conceptual reasoning from private law doctrines is a more
dominant feature of English than American law.109
and the Ocean: The Two Rationalities of European Private Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF EURO-
PEAN PRIVATE LAW 139, 142 (Roger Brownsword, Hans-W Micklitz, Leone Niglia & Stephen
Weatherill eds., 2011) (noting that both “juridical” and “instrumentalist” approaches to
private law can be used for conservative or liberal ends).
104 English courts sometimes follow American results, and sometimes do not.  But even
when the results are the same, the methodology differs. See, e.g., BRUCE FELDTHUSEN, ECO-
NOMIC NEGLIGENCE: THE RECOVERY OF PURE ECONOMIC LOSS (5th ed. 2008) (recognizing
that while American and Anglo systems exhibit different ways of conceptualizing pure eco-
nomic loss torts, the results are remarkably similar); Peter Handford, Psychiatric Injury in
Breach of a Relationship, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 26, 46–48 (2007); Jane Stapleton, Comparative
Economic Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused “Middle Theory,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 531, 556–59
(2002); Kay Wheat, Proximity and Nervous Shock, 32 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 313, 335
(2003).
105 For contract law, see Eyal Zamir, Contract Law and Theory: Three Views of the Cathedral,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 2077, 2117–23 (2014) (noting relatively individualistic and conservative
nature of U.S. contract law).  For tort, see Schwartz, Beginning and Possible End, supra note
86, at 681–83.  For a discussion of the professional liability cases, see Goldberg & Zipursky,
supra note 78, at 1775 nn.160–61.
106 See Saiman, Restitution in America, supra note 29, at 103.
107 See LAW COMMISSION, LAW OF CONTRACT: THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, 1986, Cmnd.
9700 § 2.45 (UK) (“While a wider parol evidence rule seems to have existed at one time,
no such wider rule could, in our view, properly be said to exist in English law today.”).  For
a review of the more formal American doctrine, see Gregory Klass, Parol Evidence Rules and
the Mechanics of Choice, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 457, 485–86 (2019).
108 See Goldberg, supra note 102, at 1641–53; Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism be
Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 643–60 (1999) (noting that many expressions
of modern American formalism are defended on empirical or consequential grounds).
109 This trend is also reflected in the academy. See Susan Bartie, The Lingering Core of
Legal Scholarship, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 354–55 (2010) (explaining that core doctrinal
scholarship about common/private law matters is held in higher esteem in England and
Australia than in the United States); John H. Langbein, Scholarly and Professional Objectives
in Legal Education: American Trends and English Comparisons, in WHAT ARE LAW SCHOOLS FOR?
1, 5 (P.B.H. Birks ed., 1996); Stapleton, supra note 104, at 571–74; see also Reinhard Zim-
mermann, Essay, Law Reviews: A Foray Through a Strange World, 47 EMORY L.J. 659, 688–90,
689 n.155 (1998) (noting demise of doctrinal scholarship in American law reviews).
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II.  RELOCATING FORMALISM
Notwithstanding the vast impact of realism on American law, formalism
did not disappear.  Instead it moved to the areas of law left open by the
receding private law: originalism and structuralism on the constitutional
front,110 textualism on the statutory and administrative front,111 and jurisdic-
tional demarcations of the role of courts on the procedural front.112
These shifts can be seen by contrasting theories put forth by each sys-
tem’s leading conceptualists of the past generation: the late Professor Peter
Birks in the Anglo world, and the late Justice Scalia in the American.  As
Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, Birks held one of the most prestigi-
ous academic posts in the non-American English-speaking world.113  Though
his primary focus was restitution,114 by seeding a generation of students as
judges and professors across England and the Commonwealth, Birks became
the most influential figure in English private law.115
Birks was a doctrinal lawyer whose oeuvre is dominated by claims that
taxonomy, analytical mapping, and tight conceptual categories are the foun-
dations of proper legal thinking.116  Though not jurisprude, Birks under-
110 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1–19 (1999); ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE
(Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory For-
malism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 697 (1999); John F. Manning, Statutory Pragmatism and
Constitutional Structure, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1170–74 (2007); Antonin Scalia, Original-
ism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851–54 (1989).
111 Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 545–52 (1983); John
F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 697–702 (1997).
112 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1155–56, 1159–64 (1992); J. Harvie Wil-
kinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1702–06 (2004).
113 Andrew Burrows & Alan Rodger, Introduction to MAPPING THE LAW: ESSAYS IN MEM-
ORY OF PETER BIRKS 1 (Andrew Burrows & Alan Rodger eds., 2006).
114 See generally PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1985);
PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2d ed. 2005), along with scores of articles.  As a testa-
ment to his influence, Birks served as the editor of the first edition of Oxford’s two volume
treatise titled ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW (Peter Birks ed., 2000).
115 On Birks’s influence, see Introduction to MAPPING THE LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF
PETER BIRKS, supra note 113, at 1, 1–9; Charles Rickett & Ross Grantham, In Memoriam—
Professor Peter Birks, in STRUCTURE AND JUSTIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS FOR PETER
BIRKS 1, 1–4 (Charles Rickett & Ross Grantham eds., 2008); Gerard McMeel, What Kind of
Jurist Was Peter Birks?, 19 RESTITUTION L. REV. 15, 15 (2011); see also Jack Beatson, Peter Birks,
GUARDIAN (July 15, 2004), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2004/jul/16/guardia-
nobituaries.obituaries (observing that Birks’s “intellectual legacy is the unusually large
group of productive legal scholars who can accurately be described as Birksian in their
approach”).
116 Commonwealth skepticism of the Birksian project can be found in, for example,
STEPHEN WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING 4–22 (2003); Steve Hedley, ‘And So the Legal World Goes
Round’: The Search for a Meaningful Law of Restitution 1 (Oct. 2016) (unpublished man-
uscript) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2854292) (“If ‘unjust enrichment’ is our
map, we need something in addition to help us decide where we should be going.”).
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stood his own project in contrast to American realism.  “A sound taxonomy
. . . is an essential precondition of rationality” which stands as a bulwark
against realism, which will always “play from a winning hand” unless the law is
rigidly classified.117  Birks held that conceptual thought is essential to “hon-
our the democratic bargain”118 (what Americans know as the countermajori-
tarian difficulty), since rule by judges is only justified if judges are “both the
masters and the servants of a complex system of reasoning.”119  This “special-
ised rationality” of the law differentiates it from legislative politics or popular
notions of rationality.120  The “best hope of controlling power” in complex
modern society,121 said Birks, is a rigorous and rigid classification scheme
whose “raw materials are all in place in the law library.”122  Drawing a pur-
poseful contrast to the realist legacy of Holmes, Birks called for “more logic
and less experience.”123  Without systematized taxonomy, law is “no more
than an alibi for illegitimate power.”124
Variations of these concerns are equally present in the writing of
Antonin Scalia.  Like Birks, Scalia forcefully argued that only a confined
account of judging could address concerns over the judicial role in a democ-
racy.  But while the desire to constrain judges led Birks to deepen the con-
ceptual account of private law, Scalia assumes it is irredeemably realist.
Scalia’s theories are designed to protect the democratic bargain by keeping
private law away from the most important departments of American law.
While Scalia’s celebrated essay Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System is
usually remembered for introducing textualism, the essay does not open with
a discussion of statutes.125  Instead, Scalia restates and effectively reaffirms
the hyper-realist account of the common law.  Recounting the excitement of
a first-year contracts class, Scalia notes:
What intellectual fun all of this is!  It explains why first-year law school is
so exhilarating: because it consists of playing common-law judge, which in
turn consists of playing king—devising, out of the brilliance of one’s own
mind, those laws that ought to govern mankind.  How exciting!126
While Birks and Anglo conceptualists argue for the classical idea that
judges merely declare preexisting common-law principles rather than make
117 Peter Birks, Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy, 26 U.W. AUSTRALIA L.
REV. 1, 4, 98 (1996) (praising Anglo law for “not yet succumb[ing] to the realist destruc-
tion of legal science”).
118 Id. at 97.
119 Id. at 98–99; see also Birks, supra note 57, at 214–15 (“Lawyers have no special com-
petence in distributive justice.”).
120 Birks, supra note 117, at 98.
121 Id. at 99.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 5.
124 Id. at 99.
125 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy
Gutmann ed, 1997).
126 Id. at 7.
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law through their judgments, Scalia expressly rejects it.127  And while Birks
finds the judge constrained by the law’s internal reasoning, following the
realists, Scalia holds it is empty rhetoric.  Precedent and legal analysis only
appear to constrain, but in reality (realism!), the common-law judge picks the
rule first and proceeds by “distinguishing one prior case on the left, straight-
arming another one on the right, high-stepping away from another prece-
dent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he reaches the goal—
good law.”128
Though “content to leave the [state-based private] common law”
alone,129 Scalia’s aim is to keep these realist sensibilities far from the text-
driven “civil-law system” of federal statutory, procedural, and constitutional
law.130  The goal is not only to drive a wedge between common law and stat-
ute, but to quarantine the realist assumptions that infected private law from
the formalist approach he deemed mandated by a structural reading of the
Constitution.
Whether by genius, luck, or foresight, Scalia’s move proved prescient.
Though American private law continues to bear its realist heritage (recent
counter-trends are discussed later), the “civil law” of statutes and procedure
took a dramatic turn in Scalia’s direction.  But while American formalism
shifted to public, statutory, and procedural law, these shifts are not typical of
the Anglo world.  There, private law formalism remains strong and its doc-
trines are significant across the legal orbit. And it has not been displaced by
American-styled jurisdictional and interpretation law.
The ensuing Parts show why these trends are related.
III. FORMALISM IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The standard account offers little mystery over why legal doctrine moved
from private law toward statutory interpretation.  The administrative state is a
creature of statute.  As lawmaking power moved from the common law to the
tools of legislated governance, intensive doctrinal analysis followed.
Familiarity with Anglo law complicates this wisdom.  The regulatory state
is a feature of many twentieth century common-law regimes.  But outside the
United States, common law is less likely to be displaced by the law of interpre-
127 Id. at 10 (“It is only in this century, with the rise of legal realism, that we came to
acknowledge that judges in fact ‘make’ the common law . . . .”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judgment); Allan
Beever, The Declaratory Theory of Law, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 421–23 (2013); Peter
Birks, Mistakes of Law, 53 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 205, 217–18 (2000); Priel, supra note 10,
at 170 (observing that Anglo conceptualists are the “last holdouts of the declaratory the-
ory”).  For a rehabilitation of the concept by an American textualist, see Stephen E. Sachs,
Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527, 532–559 (2019).
128 SCALIA, supra note 125, at 9.
129 Id. at 12.
130 Id. at 7.
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tation and its norms are correspondingly less doctrinalized.131  The differ-
ence may have less to do with the existence of statutes per se than with
assumptions governing how they are read.
A. Theories of Statutory Interpretation
Few areas of American law have been subject to more recent scholarly
conceptualization than statutory interpretation.132  What began as relatively
quixotic efforts by Justice Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook in the 1980s133
begat enough textualist theory and counter-theory to occupy libraries.  Tex-
tualism is premised on a structural reading of the Constitution that requires
courts to stand dormant unless directed to act by an express statutory man-
date.  The result is inward-facing doctrines that focus exclusively on legislated
text, while prohibiting consideration of other social or even legal factors in
discerning statutory meaning.134
While the textualist mode has not gained universal adoption,135 inter-
pretation at all levels of American law moved decisively in this direction as
debates regarding textualism’s conceptual and empirical underpinnings have
become a mainstay of scholarly and judicial writing.
Anglo interpretation by contrast is less theorized, less salient in the acad-
emy,136 less doctrinalized, less politically contentious—and notably less textu-
alist.137  Generalizing from writings by Justices on the UK Supreme Court,138
131 Scholars have recently taken to conceptualizing statutory interpretation as hard doc-
trinal rules of law rather than unwritten “rules of thumb.” See William Baude & Stephen E.
Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (2017).  Others discuss
whether Erie principles apply to statutory interpretation law. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Inter-
systemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898,
1907–24 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation]; Abbe R. Gluck, The
Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 753, 811 (2013).
132 See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 241 (1992).
133 See generally SCALIA, supra note 125; Easterbrook, supra note 111.
134 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional
Interpretation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 700 (2008) (describing how, post-Erie, federal courts
lack constitutional authority to engage in policymaking decisions characteristic of com-
mon-law adjudication); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387,
2390 (2003).
135 See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey
of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1310 (2018) (con-
cluding that few appellate judges fully subscribe to Scalian textualism).
136 See STATUTE L. SOC’Y, TEACHING LEGISLATION IN UNITED KINGDOM LAW SCHOOLS:
SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS 6 (2011), http://www.statutelawsociety.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/01/Teachinglegislation-surveyresultsMar12.pdf (finding fewer than twenty
percent of English law schools have a course on legislation).
137 See Ben Chen & Jeff Gordon, Interpretive Formalism in the Law of Obligations: Thirty
Years After Form and Substance, in FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 373,
373 (Andrew Robertson & James Goudkamp eds, 2019) (explaining that, while American
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the High Court of Australia,139 the English Court of Appeal,140 and one of
Oxford’s leading private law scholars, now a Justice on the UK Supreme
Court,141 a reasonably consistent picture emerges.  While Anglo interpreta-
tion was flat and literalist in the middle decades of the twentieth century, it
has shifted toward the approach of midcentury American legal process schol-
ars.142  English and Commonwealth scholars have their share of methodolog-
ical disagreements,143 and are concerned with judicial usurpations of the
parliamentary role.144  But attention to these matters pales in comparison to
the intensity found within American law.
These differences are made concrete in the rhetorical gap between
English law’s always-speaking canon and the textualist approach to updating
(or rather, not updating) legal meaning over time.  The English canon holds
that since statutes are written in the eternally present tense (they are “always
speaking”), they must be read in light of contemporary law and policy.145
statutory interpretation has become more formalist, Australian courts have moved in the
opposite direction).
138 See JUSTICE JOHN DYSON, The Shifting Sands of Statutory Interpretation, in JUSTICE: CON-
TINUITY AND CHANGE 114, 115–24 (2018).
139 See Justice Michael Kirby, Statutory Interpretation: The Meaning of Meaning, 35 MEL-
BOURNE U. L. REV. 113, 116 (2011).
140 See Justice Philip Sales, Modern Statutory Interpretation, 38 STATUTE L. REV. 125,
128–29 (2017).
141 See ANDREW BURROWS, THINKING ABOUT STATUTES: INTERPRETATION, INTERACTION,
IMPROVEMENT (2018).
142 See id. at 79 – 81.
143 See, e.g., Justice James Spigelman, The Intolerable Wrestle: Developments in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 84 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 822, 831 (2010); see also James Edelman, Justice of the High
Court of Australia, Address at the Constitutional Centre Twilight Seminar: Uncommon
Statutory Interpretation (May 6, 2012), https://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/_files/
uncommon_statutory_interpretation_may_2012.pdf.
144 See, e.g., R ex rel. Prudential plc v. Special Comm’r of Income Tax [2013] UKSC 1,
[2013] 2 All ER 247 [52], [61]–[67] (Lord Neuberger P); id. at [81] (Lord Hope DP); id.
at [101] (Lord Reed SCJ); Woolwich Bldg. Soc’y v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs (No. 2)
[1992] 3 All ER 737 (HL) at 783 (Lord Slynn of Hadley) (expressing doubts about the line
between common-law development and usurping legislative role); see also Michael v. Chief
Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] 2 All ER 635 [130] (Lord Toulson
SCJ).  For scholarly commentary by English and Commonwealth judges, see TOM BINGHAM,
The Judge as Lawmaker: An English Perspective, in THE BUSINESS OF JUDGING: SELECTED ESSAYS
AND SPEECHES 25, 25–34 (2000); Michael Kirby, Judicial Activism, 27 U.W. AUSTRALIA L. REV.
1, 1–3 (1997); Robert Walker, Developing the Common Law: How Far is Too Far?, 37 MEL-
BOURNE U. L. REV. 232, 250–53 (2013); Lord John Dyson, Where the Common Law Fears to
Tread, 34 STATUTE L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2013).
145 See, e.g., R v. Ireland [1997] 4 All ER 225 (HL) at 228–29, 233 (owing to the always-
speaking canon, the term “actual bodily harm” found in an 1861 statute is read to include
“psychiatric illness” even though this was not within the intention of the Victorian legisla-
ture).  A more controversial application is found in Yemshaw, where a 3–2 majority found
the government’s obligation to provide accommodation for the victims of “violence” under
the Housing Act extended to nonphysical domestic violence. See Yemshaw v. Hounslow
London Borough Council [2011] UKSC 3, [2011] All ER 912 [27]–[29] (Lady Hale SCJ).
Some criticized the court for trespassing on Parliament’s domain. See Richard Ekins,
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Textualists, by contrast, are concerned that allowing a court to interpret
older text in light of current policy affords too much room to interpose judi-
cial policy judgments onto the statute.  Textualism rejects the always-speaking
canon and deliberately freezes statutory language as of the moment of its
enactment.146  This does not mean that all—or even most—cases are
decided differently, but it does lead each system to ask different questions.
B. Textualism and the Shrinking Role of Private Law
1. Implied Rights of Action
One of the most important shifts wrought by textualism involves whether
a court can imply a private right of action for violations of statutory directives.
In the midcentury, American courts often answered in the affirmative,147 and
when statutes did not spell out relevant burdens of proof, defenses, standards
of care, or remedies, these courts looked to analogous private law to fill the
gaps.148  Since textualism casts this form of reasoning into disrepute,149 how-
ever, private law has become less relevant to statutory interpretation.150
Though Anglo courts rarely match the expansiveness of midcentury
American interpretation, they assume that that a private right can be inferred
from a statute even absent an express textual mandate.  One doctrinal
expression of this view is embedded in the tort known as “breach of statutory
Updating the Meaning of Violence, 129 LAW Q. REV. 17, 20 (2013); see also Edelman, supra
note 143 (transcript at 26–29).
146 See, e.g., New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (“[A] ‘fundamental
canon of statutory construction’ [is] that words generally should be ‘interpreted as taking
their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.” (omissions in
original) (quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018))). But see
id. at 544 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[S]ometimes, ‘[w]ords in statutes can enlarge or
contract their scope as other changes, in law or in the world . . . make old applications
anachronistic.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 218
(1999))).
147 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (“[I]t is the duty of the courts to
. . . provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.”).
More generally, see Donna L. Goldstein, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Stat-
utes: Congressional Intent, Judicial Deference, or Mutual Abdication?, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 611,
615 (1982) (observing that, in the 1960s, courts often implied rights of action); Linda
Sheryl Greene, Judicial Implication of Remedies for Federal Statutory Violations: The Separation of
Powers Concerns, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 469, 475–77 (1980) (same).
148 See Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1,
45–48, 51 (2015) (“[C]ourts that might once have invoked generic principles of unwritten
law now use the rubric of statutory interpretation to impute answers to the particular fed-
eral statute that they are implementing.”).
149 See Jonathan A. Marcantel, Abolishing Implied Private Rights of Action Pursuant to Fed-
eral Statutes, 39 J. LEGISLATION 251, 268–69, 271–78 (2013).
150 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287–93 (2001) (affirming that courts must
look only to the text and not rely on the “contemporary legal context” to determine
whether this is a private right of action); Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Justice Scalia, Implied Rights of
Action, and Historical Practice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2077, 2084–89 (2017).
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duty.”151  This action is a hybrid of statutory text and common-law principles,
where the legal duty is drawn from statute, while the infrastructure of the tort
claim is imported from private law.152
This tort reflects English law’s rejection of the textualist and realist
dichotomy, so often stressed by Scalia, that laws are either expressly legislated
or else fabricated by judges.  Consider the following black letter statement of
the High Court of Australia:
The intention that such a private right shall exist is not . . . conjured up by
judges to give effect to their own ideas of policy and then “imputed” to the
legislature.  The legitimate endeavour of the courts is to determine what
inference really arises . . . from the nature, scope and terms of the statute,
including the nature of the evil against which it is directed, the nature of the
conduct prescribed, the pre-existing state of the law, and, generally, the
whole range of circumstances relevant upon a question of statutory
interpretation . . . .153
For textualism, this is heresy, and exactly what it is designed to avoid.154
Yet this framing stands as the uncontested black letter rule in breach of statu-
tory duty cases.155
2. The Demise of General Federal Common Law
One common explanation for the demise of common law within the
federal statutory scheme is that such interpolations are constitutionally pro-
hibited.  This view assumes the Supreme Court’s dictum in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, stating that there is “no federal general common law,”156 precludes
courts from referencing the common law in statutory interpretation.
However, as Caleb Nelson has explained, in its original meaning as
understood in the decades following Erie, this dictum applied only to a rela-
tively narrow class of cases.  When proceeding in diversity (or ancillary) juris-
diction, a federal court must point to the common-law rules of a specific state
rather than a vaguer set of “federal general common law.”157  Beyond that,
Erie initially had minimal impact on how common law interacted with federal
151 See Neil Foster, Statutes and Civil Liability in the Commonwealth and the United States: A
Comparative Critique, in TORT LAW: CHALLENGING ORTHODOXY 170, 173 (Stephen G.A. Pitel,
Jason W. Neyers & Erika Chamberlain eds., 2013).
152 See Brit Am Tobacco Exports BV v Trojan Trading Co Pty [2010] VSC 572 (23 December
2010) [26] (Vic) (“Breach of statutory duty is a type of tort, in which the statute creates a
civil right and the common law supplies a remedy, (such as damages).”); see also Lochgelly
Iron & Coal Co. v. McMullan [1934] AC 1 (HL) at 9 (Lord Atkins) (holding that, though
the duty arises from statute, breach of statutory duty is a tort); id. at 18 (Lord MacMillan)
(same); id. at 23 (Lord Wright) (same).
153 Sovar v Henry Lane Pty Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 397, 405 (Austl.) (emphasis added).
154 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–87.
155 See Foster, supra note 151.
156 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
157 Id.; see Nelson, supra note 148, at 51.
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statutes.158  Indeed, in the post-Erie heyday of the legal process school, courts
frequently drew on common/private-law concepts to gloss statutory
regimes.159
Starting in the 1980s, however, the “no federal general common law”
dictum became an argument that textualism is a doctrine of structural consti-
tutionalism necessary to protect the separation of powers.160  The phrase
may now mean that federal courts are barred from extending statutes in light
of unwritten (often private law) principles.161  Craig Green has labelled this
Erie’s “New Myth,”162 but myth or otherwise, this view deliberately rejects the
approach of the legal process school and holds that written statutes and com-
mon law are like “oil and water” that cannot mix.  The result—if not the
goal—is to restrict (unwritten) private law from infiltrating the federal statu-
tory domain.163
The aversion to reading statutes in light of common law means questions
that once implicated general common law are recast as matters of statutory
interpretation law.164  Take for example whether claimants in bankruptcy
can assert property rights over specific assets, or whether they must cast their
lot with the unsecured creditors who typically get mere pennies on the dollar.
Anglo-Commonwealth law understands this as a private law issue that
requires theorizing the boundaries of contract, property, equity, and restitu-
tion.165  A line of American decisions, however, approaches the matter by
setting up a contest between private/common-law rights arising from state
law (which tends to allow claimants to assert specific property rights) and the
textual reading of the Federal Bankruptcy Code (understood to favor pro-
158 See Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 597–97 (2008)
(observing that Erie carries no implications for federal interpretation of federal law)
159 See cases and materials cited in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZA-
BETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUB-
LIC POLICY 598–622, 955–971 (4th ed. 2007).
160 This trend was noted as early as the mid-1980s. See George D. Brown, Of Activism
and Erie—The Implication Doctrine’s Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69
IOWA L. REV. 617, 620–21 (1984) (observing that Erie is cited to limit the common-law
powers of federal courts interpreting federal law).
161 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (2004); Craig Green, Can Erie
Survive as Federal Common Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813, 827 nn.73–74 (2013) (citing
sources for this trend).
162 See Green, supra note 158, at 596–97, 615.
163 See id. at 629; see also Nelson, supra note 148, at 24 nn.80–82.
164 See Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwrit-
ten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 750–51 (2013).
165 See FHR Eur. Ventures LLP v. Cedar Cap. Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45, [43]; In re
Polly Peck Int’l plc (No. 2) v. Stone [1998] 3 All ER 812 (AC) at 827; In re Goldcorp Exch.
Ltd. [1994] 2 All ER 806 (PC) at 828; Fortex Grp Ltd v MacIntosh [1998] 3 NZLR 171 (CA) at
178–79 (N.Z.); see also Birks, supra note 57; Liew, supra note 59, at 529–34, 549; Graham
Virgo, The Genetically Modified Constructive Trust, 2 CANADIAN J. COMPAR. & CONTEMP. L. 579,
579–83 (2016).
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rata distribution).166  Andrew Kull, America’s leading restitution scholar,
notes that under textualist readings of the Bankruptcy Code,167 “the most
orthodox legal proposition, if not tied to a specific code section, may actually
be challenged as spurious.”168
As formalized textualism expands, undertheorized private law shrinks.
C. Textualism and the Freezing of Equity
Part I noted that some of the most significant differences between
English and American private law surround doctrines of restitution and
equity.  English law approaches these questions in terms of “hard-nosed prop-
erty rights,”169 and fashions remedies precisely correlating to the breach,
while American law interprets equity as a zone of flexible discretion.170
In the absence of private law constraints American courts have produced
a series of peculiar “only in America” textualist doctrines that ponder how
contemporary lawsuits would have been decided by the equity courts of the
late eighteenth century.  Here the tables are reversed.  Questions that Anglo
lawyers see as basic applications of private law rules become tangled in convo-
luted historical quagmires that resist functionalist analysis.  And what English
law sees as boring, apolitical “lawyers’ law”171 becomes transformed into
heated ideological battles at the U.S. Supreme Court.  Two examples serve as
demonstrations.
Computerized banking systems make it easy for funds to be instantane-
ously transferred across the globe.  In response, commercial claimants have
sought ex-parte freeze orders preventing defendants from hiding monies that
may be needed to satisfy a judgment (commonly known as Mareva injunc-
tions).172  Using conventional analysis of equity, English courts permit these
166 See Emily Sherwin, Why In re Omegas Group Was Right: An Essay on the Legal Status of
Equitable Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 885, 889–90 (2012); see also sources cited supra notes 47–54
and accompanying text.
167 See e.g., 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.02[3] (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2010); Chen & Gordon, supra note 137, at 390–91.
168 Kull, supra note 47, at 266–67 (lamenting the textualist interpretation of “common-
law statutes” such as the UCC and Bankruptcy Code).
169 Foskett v. McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 (HL) at 109 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord
Browne-Wilkinson).
170 See supra text surrounding notes 47–54; see also Saiman, Restitution and Legal Doctrine,
supra note 29, at 1004, 1017–25 (2008); Saiman, Restitution in America, supra note 29, at
112–13 (2008).
171 See ANDREW BURROWS, The Interaction Between Common Law and Statute, in THINKING
ABOUT STATUTES: INTERPRETATION, INTERACTION, IMPROVEMENT, supra note 141, at 45,
79–80, 84.
172 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 327–29
(1999).
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measures,173 and similar results obtain in the Commonwealth and several
American states.174
In a fractured 5–4 decision, however, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed
these injunctions beyond the power of federal courts.175  Given that textualist
doctrine freezes statutory meaning as of the moment of its enactment, Justice
Scalia held the relevant question is whether an equity court of 1789 (the date
of the statue authorizing federal court jurisdiction) would have issued a freez-
ing injunction.176  (Answer: no.)  This doctrinal apparatus transformed an
otherwise private law inquiry about the merits of the injunction into a histori-
cal one.
Further, in contrast to the functionalism attending many American
applications of equity,177 Scalia’s majority opinion is unmoved by pragmatic
concerns or the dissent’s methodological critiques of its statutory antiquari-
anism.178  Channeling separation of powers concerns, Scalia held that fed-
eral courts are barred from creating remedies “previously unknown to equity
jurisprudence.”179  Functionalist concerns are irrelevant to reading the statu-
tory text and should instead be directed to “where such issues belong in our
democracy: in the Congress.”180
Commonwealth observers were notably unimpressed.  Writing in the
Law Quarterly Review, Lawrence Collins (later, Lord Collins of the UK
Supreme Court) explained that “from an English viewpoint, the discussion
. . . seems to be superficial and based on obsolete material.”181  Not to be
outdone, an Irish scholar took to an American law review to note the Court’s
reasoning was “sloppy, superficial, intemperate, bombastic, unbalanced, and
173 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. Int’l Bulkcarriers SA [1980] 1 All ER 213 (AC) at
215 (Lord Denning MR); Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis [1975] 3 All ER 282 (AC) at
283 (Lord Denning MR).  The result was later confirmed by a formal rule. See CIV. P. R.
25.1(f) (1998) (UK) (authorizing freezing injunctions)
174 See David Capper, Essay, The Need for Mareva Injunctions Reconsidered, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2161, 2162 (2005) (“The only major common law jurisdiction where the Mareva
injunction has not flourished is the United States.”); Masayuki Tamaruya, The Anglo-Ameri-
can Perspective on Freezing Injunctions, 29 CIV. JUST. Q. 350, 354–55 (2010).
175 See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 333.
176 Id. at 332.
177 See supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text.
178 See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“[The majority] relies on an unjustifiably static conception of equity jurisdic-
tion. . . . [W]e have defined the scope of federal equity in relation to the principles of equity
existing at the separation of this country from England, [not] the specific practices and
remedies of the pre-Revolutionary Chancellor.” (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted)).
179 Id. at 332 (majority opinion).
180 See id. at 332–33; see also Tamaruya, supra note 174, at 363–68 (noting that, while
practical differences are less dramatic, there are strong methodological differences
between the judiciary and the political valence of legal procedure).
181 Lawrence Collins, United States Supreme Court Rejects Mareva Jurisdiction, 115 LAW Q.
REV. 601, 604 (1999).
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downright insulting to judicial colleagues in kindred legal traditions.”182  A
more measured Commonwealth writer framed the matter in terms of com-
parative allocations of private and statutory/procedural law.  What English
lawyers see as debtor-creditor law administered by commercially sophisticated
judges in London, becomes a political hot potato over the remedial latitude
granted federal courts in America.183
D. Textualism and Trusting Trust Law
A similar example emerges from the U.S. Supreme Court’s reading of
ERISA, a federal statute designed to fortify trust law and protect employees’
benefit and retirement plans from employer maladministration.184  Tradi-
tional trust law required fiduciaries (or their agents) to fully compensate ben-
eficiaries for the financial consequences of a breach.  ERISA seems to embed
this obligation in statue, allowing beneficiaries to obtain an injunction or
“other appropriate equitable relief” upon a showing of breach.185
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia’s 5–4 decision reasoned that by including the
term equitable in the phrase “appropriate equitable relief,” Congress really
intended to limit the range of remedial options to those “typically available in
[historical] equity.”186  Because Scalia incorrectly held that compensatory
damages were typically available only “at law” but not “in equity,” the claim
was barred.187
The result is plainly difficult.  ERISA “abounds with the language and
terminology of trust law” and codifies “principles developed in the evolution
of the law of trusts.”188  Though the Court did not contest that monetary
compensation for breach of trust was historically available in equity,189 the
Court’s textualist assumptions allowed it to assume the term “equitable” must
limit available remedies to those deemed “typically equitable.”190  Scalia’s
oversimplified understanding that money damages were “typically legal,”
allowed the claim to be denied.  Paradoxically, ERISA beneficiaries are worse
off under the statute than under the common law it was designed to fortify.
182 Capper, supra note 174, at 2180.
183 Tamaruya, supra note 174, at 356–57, 363.
184 See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of
Error in Russell, Mertens and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1321–31 (2003).
185 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a), 88
Stat. 829, 891 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1131(a)(3) (2018)).
186 Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (emphasis in original).
187 See id. at 256, 260 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Mer-
tens, 508 U.S. 248 (No. 91-1671)).
188 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989); see also Langbein,
supra note 184, at 1326 (observing that ERISA’s drafters assumed the trust law background
would allow further “refinements to be worked out in fiduciary practice under regulatory
and judicial oversight”).
189 See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.  For common-law background, see UNIF. TR. CODE
§§ 1001(b)(3), 1002(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 205 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1959).
190 Langbein, supra note 184, at 1353 (emphasis added).
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The trouble did not end there.  A follow-up case sought restitution from
an ERISA beneficiary who received payments for the same claim from two
different insurers.191  In another 5–4 ruling, Scalia denied recovery on the
theory that ERISA only permits “equitable” rather than “legal” restitution.192
Both the dissent and commentariat decried the fancifulness of this view.193
ERISA was enacted two generations after the merger of law and equity in the
federal system, and these technical-historical distinctions were hardly on the
minds of the drafters of the time.  Rather than interpret “equitable” as refer-
ring to traditional trust law—the commonplace meaning when the statute
was drafted194—Scalia held that in using this single word Congress intended
to stealthily revive the distinction between legal and equitable restitution,
with recovery limited only to the latter.195
These ERISA and equity cases neatly illustrate the interplay between tex-
tualism, private law, and the demand for formalized doctrine to restrain legal
liability.  By pressing interpretation inward, textualism decreases the rele-
vance of background private law and reframes the issue exclusively in terms
of statutory interpretation law.  The related anxiety over federal common law
causes the Court to “treat[ ] ordinary applications of traditional fiduciary and
remedy law as impermissible extensions of the statute.”196  Further, the
Court’s lack of familiarity with private law leads it towards implausible under-
standings of such basic concepts as “restitution” and “equity,” and thus bun-
gles how they function within a complex statutory scheme.197  Finally, they
show that American-styled formalism can produce equity doctrines every bit
as baroque as the analysis in Foskett, which looked to Roman laws on commin-
gled oil to determine how money flows through the modern banking
system.198
The private-law-centric approach of English law is not afraid of “equita-
ble remedies.”  By contrast, since the American system gives courts broad
remedial discretion, it will invariably impose limits by other means—up to
191 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 206–09 (2002).  Further
implications of this doctrine are found in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 547
U.S. 356, 359, 361–63 (2006); CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 424–25, 439 (2011); US
Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 98 (2013); and Montanile v. Board of Trustees of the
National Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan, 577 U.S. 136, 142–44 (2016).
192 See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 209–10.
193 See id. at 224–25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Langbein, supra note 184, at 1320 n.15.
194 This was the most likely meaning of the term to a late twentieth century American
lawyer. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 265–67 (White, J., dissenting).
195 See Langbein, supra note 184, at 1356–57 (asserting that Scalia’s reading wholly
ignores innovation of the 1937 Restatement of Restitution, which anchors restitution in unjust
enrichment rather than dividing it into law and equity).
196 Id. at 1329 (emphasis in original).
197 For more on this theme, see Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 503, 525, 544–51 (2006) (arguing that U.S. courts have no coherent theory or
practice governing how principles of general law are relevant to statutory interpretation).
198 See Foskett v. McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 (HL) at 121 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(Lord Hope).
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and including convoluting modern legal analysis with the jurisdictional
assumptions of a bygone era.199
IV. PROCEDURAL FORMALISM
Civil procedure in American law is not merely about how litigation is
conducted or the docket managed, it is a foundational tool used to keep
courts—particularly federal courts—from straying outside their constitu-
tional lane.  In the middle part of the twentieth century, courts armed with
the newly minted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure worked to remove proce-
dural hurdles and steer litigation toward substantive issues,200 but more
recently, procedural doctrines have become increasingly restrictive.  Modern
courts apply a number of “antecedent” procedural bars designed to weed out
claims before the substantive merits are addressed.201
The shift in the valance of procedural law has led Arthur Miller, one of
the most eminent scholars in the area, to issue a series of laments over the
closing of the courthouse door.202  Though Miller’s normative assessment is
contestable, his observations regarding how procedure structures civil litiga-
tion are hard to discount.203  By both law and custom, procedural matters are
199 See Chen & Gordon, supra note 137, at 399–400; Saiman, Restitution in America, supra
note 29.
200 The history of the Federal Rules and its philosophical roots are chronicled in Ste-
phen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 943–75 (1987). See Charles E. Clark, The Hand-
maid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 316–17 (1938) (noting the improved flexibility and
simplicity of the Federal Rules as promulgated in 1938).
201 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 54 (2010)
(discussing the recent introduction of new antecedent pleading requirements).  Empirical
assessments of these requirements include: David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle
and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013); Jonah B. Gelbach, Note,
Locking the Doors to Discovery?  Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery,
121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading,
101 VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015).  More positive assessments of this trend are found in Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, Essay, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621, 1622
(2012); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473,
474–75 (2010).
202 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing?  What’s Happened to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 592–96 (2011); Arthur R.
Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
60 DUKE L.J. 1, 23–24 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court,
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
286, 372 (2013); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984–85 (2003).
203 See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1841–56 (2014) (cataloging procedural devices used since the
1980s to dispose of civil cases).
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dealt with first,204 deferring consideration of all other issues to later stages in
the litigation.205  Because lawyers are incentivized to fight first and hardest
on procedural terrain, the allocation of conceptual and doctrinal resources
follows.  While these impacts are most prominent in federal courts, scholars
have examined how these norms trickle down to state litigation.206
English procedural law, by contrast, is both less formalized and less
important.207  A course in the topic is not even offered in most English law
schools,208 and the subject is “barely on the curricular map.”209  Scholars
from England’s leading academic hubs have only recently started to write
books on procedure,210 as English lawyers learn the subject in vocational pro-
grams administered by the bar associations.211  One commentator ruefully
noted how “civil procedure has not attracted a high level of academic atten-
tion or sustained critical examination as compared with other areas of law,”
and was dismayed at the “paucity of rigorous analytical or theoretical litera-
ture” in the Commonwealth.212  Even private law scholars complain that
English students live under the “mistaken but tenacious impression that civil
204 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95, 101 (1998) (holding
that courts must determine subject matter jurisdiction before determining the merits); 32A
AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 562, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2020).
205 See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (noting that when
“only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction
by dismissing the case without prejudice.” (footnote omitted)).
206 See Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 703
(2016) (“[F]ederal law exerts a gravitational force that draws states to mimic federal
law . . . .”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading in State Courts After Twombly and Iqbal, 2010
POUND CIV. JUST. INST. 1, 14–20.
207 See Paul MacMahon, Proceduralism, Civil Justice, and American Legal Thought, 34 U. PA.
J. INT’L L. 545, 563–74 (2013) (contrasting the outsized role of American procedure with
its limited role in Anglo law); see also Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Compar-
ative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 277, 278 (2002); Richard L. Marcus, Putting American
Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 709, 709, 740 (2005)
(observing that America “has a set of procedural characteristics that seem to set it off from
almost all of the rest of the world”).  For another point of comparison, see Amalia D.
Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alterna-
tive to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1211 (2005) (contrasting the centrality of
procedure in American law schools with the “negligible interest” in European legal educa-
tion, which focuses “instead on conveying abstract principles of substantive law”).
208 Andrew Boon & Julian Webb, Legal Education and Training in England and Wales:
Back to the Future?, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 79, 80 (2008); see also MacMahon, supra note 207, at
570 n.92.
209 See NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEW CIVIL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM 23 (2003); MacMahon, supra note 207, at 574 n.111.
210 See ANDREWS, supra note 209; see also ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE: PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE (3d ed. 2013).
211 See MacMahon, supra note 207, at 570.
212 Susan M.C. Gibbons, Book Review, 4 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 129, 129–30
(2004) (reviewing ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003)).
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procedure consists of an arbitrary set of technical rules, to be endured in the
real world but ignored in university.”213
A. Contemporary Standing Doctrine
Few doctrines better encapsulate the differences between English and
American formalism than standing law, “perhaps the most important of [all
the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional] doctrines.”214  As conceptualized by Jus-
tice Scalia and fellow travelers, standing vindicates the constitutional separa-
tion of powers.215  Standing is thus elevated to a threshold jurisdictional issue
that addresses a court’s constitutional capacity to hear the case.  Standing
cannot be waived by the parties or by the court,216 and must be raised by the
court itself even on appeal217—powerful tools rarely afforded to other
doctrines.
Despite affirmations of its foundational status, standing was not particu-
larly important prior to the rise of the administrative state.218  It was rarely
seen as constitutional or jurisdictional in scope,219 and the matters standing
law addresses were reviewed under “an amalgam of statutory interpretation
and common law assumptions”220—as remains the case under English
law.221  The Constitution’s text also says nothing about standing, and even as
avowed a textualist as Justice Scalia must find these requirements embedded
in constitutional structure rather than its express written provisions.222
213 Ben McFarlane, Book Review, 121 LAW Q. REV. 343, 343 (2005) (reviewing ADRIAN
ZUCKERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003); ANDREWS, supra note 209).
214 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
215 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Pow-
ers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
559–60 (1992) (Scalia, J.); John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42
DUKE L.J. 1219, 1229 (1993).
216 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 n.1 (1996) (“[S]tanding . . . is jurisdic-
tional and not subject to waiver.”).
217 See, e.g., Pa. Prison Soc’y v. Cortés, 508 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 2007).
218 See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 275, 299 (2008) (“If injury in fact is fundamental to ensuring the balance of power,
one would expect the Court to have adopted the injury-in-fact requirement long before
1970.”).
219 See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 466–67 (2008)
(cataloguing academic critiques of standing law including that it “lacks a historical basis”);
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224 (1988) (“It is . . . clear
that current standing law is a relatively recent creation.”); James Leonard & Joanne C.
Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the Injury-in-Fact Rule, and the Framers’ Plan for Federal
Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 7 (2001) (“Standing as a constitutional
mandate itself is a relatively recent innovation.”).
220 Fletcher, supra note 219, at 226.
221 See MacMahon, supra note 207, at 568–74 (discussing differences in procedural doc-
trines between American and English systems).
222 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992); Scalia, supra note 215, at
881–82.
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The core of standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to show (1) it suffered
a concrete and particularized injury in fact, and (2) a causal connection
between the injury and the allegedly wrongful conduct.223  There is an obvi-
ous affinity between these criteria and private law doctrines as interpreted by
Anglo-conceptualists.  Both focus on the structural and correlative relation-
ship between the parties, and both seek to ensure the plaintiff has the right
of redress from its chosen defendant.  Standing parallels the function of duty
in tort, privity in contract, and the relationship between enrichment and
impoverishment in restitution law.
Despite these similarities, one of the most influential criticisms of stand-
ing law is that it does not address questions of injury and causation in light of
the legal claims at issue.224  Instead, it is formulated as an abstract and self-
consciously separate doctrine antecedent to the substantive merits of the
claim.225  As a constitutional doctrine, standing focuses on the role of courts
in a democracy rather than the correlative structure of rights and remedies.
B. Standing and Private Law
Standing perfectly exemplifies the shift from the formalism that rigor-
ously monitors the structure of the private law to American formalism that
rigorously monitors the role of the courts.226  The doctrine initially devel-
oped in the administrative law context to limit citizens’ ability to sue the state
over acts (or omissions) of executive policymaking.227  But, as a nonwaivable
antecedent issue that must be addressed it in every case, American courts
now use it to maneuver around postrealist private law.
This process becomes apparent when comparing two ostensibly similar
cases raising claims by historically disadvantaged groups for wrongs wrought
to their ancestors.  The Canadian case (Ontario Court of Appeals) sought
restitution on behalf of Chinese immigrants, while the American litigation
looked for restitution for African American slavery.  Both courts denied
recovery, but traveled different doctrinal routes to get there.  Canadian plain-
tiffs raised public law claims against the state, yet the Ontario court focused on
unjust enrichment law.228  American plaintiffs raised common-law claims
against private entities, yet the analysis proceeds along jurisdictional terms.229
223 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–60.
224 See Fletcher, supra note 219, at 231–39.
225  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
226 See, e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1114 (2006)
(describing “the Court’s jurisprudence as ‘hostility’ to ‘litigation’”).
227 See Elliott, supra note 219, at 469–501; Fletcher, supra note 219, at 225–26.
228 See Mack v. Canada (Att’y Gen.) (2002), 60 O.R. 3d 737, 750–55 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
229 In re Afr.-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1042–43 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (raising common-law claims of conspiracy, demand for accounting, crimes against
humanity, piracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, and unjust
enrichment, and one federal law claim).
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The sharpest contrast is found in the concluding lines of each opinion.
The courts recognize the outcome may sacrifice substantive justice on the
altar of formal doctrine, and therefore close with a somewhat defensive
“apology.”  Citing Beverley McLachlin (then Justice, later Chief Justice, of the
Supreme Court of Canada), the Ontario court reasoned:
[Plaintiff’s argument boils down to] this is what the dictates of justice and
fairness require; . . .
. . .  [But] recovery cannot be predicated on the bare assertion that
fairness so requires.  A general congruence with accepted principle must be
demonstrated as well. . . .
. . .  [T]he law defines what is so unjust as to require disgorgement in
terms of benefit, corresponding detriment and absence of juristic reason for
retention.  Such definition is required to preserve a measure of certainty in
the law, as well as . . . the legitimate expectation of the parties, the right of
parties to order their affairs by contract, and the right of legislators . . . to act
. . . without fear of unforeseen future liabilities.230
Though the claims were inherently public law in nature, the court
defends itself through a classically private-law-centric account of the rule of
law.231  Unjust enrichment rests within a larger conceptual private law struc-
ture that sustains the legal system.  While sympathetic, plaintiff’s claims do
not match the private law rubric and must be denied.
The American case also closes by explaining why the “tremendous suffer-
ing and ineliminable scars” of slavery do not merit recovery.232  But this con-
clusion is framed in procedural terms:
[The] claims are beyond the constitutional authority of this court. . . .  Plain-
tiffs lack essential constitutional standing . . . .  Second, prudential limita-
tions prohibit the court from deciding such broad questions of social
importance . . . .  Third, the . . . political question doctrine bars the court
from deciding the issue of slavery reparations . . . .  Fourth, Plaintiffs’ claims
are untimely. . . .  Finally, under the rules of procedure . . . Plaintiffs’ Com-
plaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . .233
Both cases were politically charged, and both conclude it is beyond the
court’s capacity to offer a remedy.  Beyond that, each frames the decision in
terms of the method of formalism that carries most weight in the legal
culture.
*  *  *
Looking beyond these two cases, the privileging of abstract standing law
over localized private law produces—at least from the English perspective—
230 Mack, 60 O.R. 3d at 755 (emphasis omitted).
231 See PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW 6 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds.,
2014) (“The goal of this book is to explore the idea that the perception of the rule of law
as an essentially public law doctrine is in fact a misperception.”).
232 In re Slave Descendants, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
233 Id. at 1075.
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bizarre cases and legal arguments.234  In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
on whether an assignee of claims who was contractually obligated to remit all
proceeds of the litigation back to the originally assigning parties maintained
a sufficient personal stake in the litigation for standing.235  Under English
law, the issue presents a black letter case of assignment that is hardly subject
to debate, much less litigation before the highest court in the land.  Yet the
case resulted in an ideologically tinged 5–4 holding on standing law.236  As
one of Oxford’s leading private law scholars quipped, if handed in as a first-
year contracts exam in an English law school, the four-Justice dissent would
have received a failing grade.237
On other occasions, there were credible concerns that standing doctrine
would prevent federal courts from hearing traditional restitution, tort, and
fiduciary claims.238  Petitioners in First American v. Edwards argued that vic-
tims of a kickback scheme lacked standing to pursue relief since they could
not show individuated “injury in fact,” because the kickback payments came
from third parties.239  As with assignment law, passing familiarity with unjust
enrichment makes clear that courts have long heard claims predicated on
defendant’s unjust gains despite the absence of a correlative loss by plaintiff.
American restitution scholars drove this point home, warning that “the Court
may inadvertently disrupt an important body of law that long predates the
American founding.”240  Similar arguments were advanced several years later
in the context of the Fair Credit Reporting Act where narrow interpretation
of the “concrete harm” limb of the standing inquiry threatened to preclude a
statutorily authorized restitution claim.241  Restitution scholars again filed an
234 Further difficulties of this approach are set forth in Hessick, supra note 218, at
277–78 (“[W]hatever the virtue of limiting the judiciary’s role in the vindication of public
interests, the restriction on a litigant’s ability to seek redress in the courts for a violation of
a private right is ahistorical and unjustified.”).
235 See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 271 (2008).
236 Id. at 298.  Indeed, several scholars have argued that the procedurally oriented con-
ception of the modern American standing doctrine is an invention of the middle decades
of the twentieth century. See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges,
Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1009 (2002)
(“There was no doctrine of standing prior to the middle of the twentieth century.”); Cass
R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1434
(1988) (explaining that a distinctive body of standing doctrine does not develop until the
twentieth century).
237 Conversation with Robert Stevens, Herbert Smith Freehills Professor of English Pri-
vate Law, Oxford University.
238 See Jonathan R. Siegel, Injury in Fact and the Structure of Legal Revolutions, 68 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 207, 208–11 (2015) (explaining how these questions came before the
Supreme Court).
239 See First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 567 U.S. 756 (2012) (certiorari dismissed as
improvidently granted).
240 See Brief of Reporter and Advisers to Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 1, First Am. Fin. Corp., 567 U.S.
756 (No. 10-708).
241 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544–46, 1549–50 (2016).
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amicus brief to the Court, warning that it may inadvertently “wreak havoc
with the law of restitution and unjust enrichment, barring many long-estab-
lished causes of action.”242  The Supreme Court sidestepped the issue both
times.243  But the underlying plausibility of these standing-based arguments
demonstrates how formalized standing law can both displace and distort pri-
vate-law analysis.
V. FORMALISM IN THE LAW OF STATE LIABILITY
I have argued that while English law relies on formalized private law, in
the American context, postrealist private law gives way to doctrinalized ver-
sions of interpretation and procedural law.  We now test this theory by com-
paring how each system addresses the state’s liability for acting beyond its
authority.  Governmental liability touches on some of the most important
issues in a democracy.  When the stakes are high, each system channels doc-
trinal energy toward its zone of perceived conceptual integrity and doctrinal
rigidity.
To the American mindset, governmental liability is a paradigmatically
public law concern that inevitably turns on close statutory analysis and juris-
dictional inquiries into the citizen’s standing.  Under English law, however,
suits against the state accord to the so-called Diceyan principle,244 which
(exceptions aside) requires that citizen and state meet as equals on the field
of private law.245  Though “in cases which do not have a parallel in private
law,” English law has developed a more administrative law framework (known
as judicial review), for questions under “private law heading[s], such as con-
tract, tort or unjust enrichment, the Diceyan orthodoxy remains.”246  “[T]he
presence of a public body essentially makes no difference,” writes a noted
Oxford scholar, “and the claim is treated as it if were between two private
parties.”247
American law begins with the opposite presumption: barring an express
waiver, sovereign immunity and other statutory schemes shield the state and
242 See Brief of Restitution and Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 1, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (No. 13-1339).
243 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545 (avoiding the issue by remanding the case back to the
lower courts); First Am. Fin. Corp., 567 U.S. at 757 (dismissing certiorari as improvidently
granted).
244 See Crown Proceedings Act of 1947, 11 Geo. 6 c. 44, § 1; Mersey Docks & Harbour
Bd. Trs. v. Gibbs, (1866) 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (HL) at 1519 (Lord Cranworth LC); see also
A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 193–194 (10th
ed. 1959).
245 See, e.g., Woolwich Bldg. Soc’y v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs (No. 2) [1992] All ER
737 (HL) at 782 (Lord Slynn of Hadley); A-G v. Blake, [2000] 4 All ER 385 (HL) at 390
(Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead); Michael v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015]
UKSC 2, [2015] 2 All ER 635 [128]–[40] (Lord Toulson SCJ).
246 REBECCA WILLIAMS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND PUBLIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
ENGLAND, FRANCE AND THE EU 16 (2010) (emphasis omitted).
247 Id.
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its officers from private actions.248  Litigation is primarily concerned with
whether immunity has been waived, as private law is relegated to a secondary
role.  Moreover, even when formal immunity doctrines are not at issue, pri-
vate law is not always determinative to assessing governmental liability.249
A. Tax Refunds
One telling comparison emerges from tax refund cases.  In the pre-
Brexit era, a given UK tax scheme was held to violate European Community
law because it improperly discriminated between UK and other EU corpora-
tions.  In response, the European Court of Justice ordered the UK taxing
authority to craft a remedy for the taxpayer comparable to what would be
available to similarly situated taxpayers under domestic law.  In a case known
as DMG, the tax authority argued that no remedy was necessary because
domestic law would time bar the refund due to the six-year limitation period
imposed by the statute from the moment the tax was paid.250  The taxpayer
countered that the statute applied only to refunds based on mistaken assess-
ments or calculations but, since this tax was deemed void ab initio as beyond
the state’s authority, the statutory limitation period does not apply.251
Instead, the taxpayer framed its claim as a common-law count in restitution
for the return of payments made under mistake of law.  The House of Lords
agreed, holding that since the limitations period for a mistaken payment
grounded in unjust enrichment does not begin until the mistake is discov-
ered (here, when the European Court held the tax contrary to Community
law), plaintiff’s claim was timely.252
A similar mode of analysis is found in other tax-related cases.  In 2007,
the House of Lords ruled that taxpayers succeeding in restitution claims for
overpaid taxes are entitled to compound interest, calculated from the time
the tax was paid.253  Subsequent litigation has shown that a seemingly techni-
248 Two of the most common limited waivers are the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671–2680 (2018) (for monetary damages), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2018) (for equitable relief). See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MAN-
NING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 877–905 (7th ed. 2015); PAUL FIGLEY, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT 55–59 (2012).
249 Cases alleging constitutional violations do not need a specific statutory waiver of
immunity. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396–98 (1971) (providing that official’s immunity from
suit does not apply to those who violate clearly established constitutional doctrines); Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908) (explaining that, notwithstanding state sovereign
immunity, a federal court can offer equitable relief against state officials when the state has
acted unconstitutionally).
250 See Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Grp. Plc v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs (DMG) [2006]
UKHL 49, [2007] 1 All ER 449 [6]–[8] (Lord Hoffmann).
251 See id. at [8].
252 See id. at [18]; cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 246, at 20–39.
253 See Sempra Metals Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs [2007] UKHL 34, [2007] 4 All
ER 657 [17] (Lord Hope of Craighead).
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cal bit of restitution law led to billions of dollars of potential governmental
liability.254
From an American perspective, two things about these cases stand out.
First, what is in essence a constitutional law question generated by overlap-
ping sovereignties of UK and European Community law became a forum to
discuss the conceptual basis of private law theory.255  Second, that notwith-
standing both the ostensibly preemptory statutory framework, and the inher-
ent public law nature of the issues in question, the taxpayer’s appeal to
private law principles proved successful.256
Parallel American litigation centers almost exclusively on public law doc-
trines.257  In a case decided shortly after DMG, the U.S. Supreme Court
expressly rejected a claimant’s attempts to short-circuit administrative reme-
dies via a private law mistaken payment theory.258  Likewise, on facts similar
to DMG, the U.S. Supreme Court found aspects of Maryland’s tax scheme
unconstitutional for discriminating between in-state and out-of-state
income.259  But the Court’s remedial analysis centered on public law ques-
tions of equal protection law, rather than the intricacies of unjust enrich-
ment theory.260
Interestingly, in a 2018 case addressing other conflicts between UK and
EU tax law, the UK Supreme Court reversed course and held that though
unjust enrichment principles entitle taxpayers to return of their overpaid
taxes as principle, they are not entitled to compound interest on these
254 See Test Claimants in the Franked Inv. Income Grp. Litig. v. Revenue and Customs
Comm’rs [2012] UKSC 19, [2012] 3 All ER 909 [3] (Lord Hope DP).  Some have critiqued
the English view as too influenced by private law and insufficiently attuned to the public
law questions. See Samuel Beswick, The Discoverability of Mistakes of Law, 2019 LLOYD’S MAR.
& COM. L.Q. 112.
255 See DMG [2007] 1 All ER at [22]–[23], [28]; id. at [38]–[39] (Lord Hope); id. at
[151]–[58] (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe); see also Sempra Metals [2007] 4 All ER at
[30]–[33].
256 See Littlewoods Ltd. v. Revenue and Customs Comm’rs [2017] UKSC 70, [2018] 1
All ER 84 (Lord Reed).  The taxpayers brought common-law restitution claims to recover
improperly collected VAT taxes going back thirty years.  Though the claim for £1.2 billion
in compound interest was rejected, the claim for restitution netted a £268 million in recov-
ery. See id. at [4]–[6].
257 See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608–611 (1990) (deciding a tax refund
case on issues of jurisdiction and sovereign immunity without addressing the underlying
restitution claim).  American litigation often focuses on whether the refund scheme meets
due process standards. See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 108–10 (1994); Harper v.
Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 100–02 (1993); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Bever-
ages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22 (1990).
258 See United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2008) (“Even
when the constitutionality of a tax is challenged, taxing authorities do in fact have an
‘exceedingly strong interest in financial stability.’” (quoting McKesson, 496 U.S. at 37)).
259 See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 575 U.S. 542, 549–50 (2015).
260 Id. at 568 (“[A] State found to have imposed an impermissibly discriminatory tax
retains flexibility in responding to this determination.” (quoting McKesson, 496 U.S. at
39–40)).
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funds.261  The UK Court’s analysis includes classic public law considerations
such as the “disruption to public finances,”262 and also addresses the tension
between potentially expansive private law claims and the confines of the stat-
utory scheme.263  Nevertheless, the UK Court also took care to explain rever-
sal in light of private law theory, relying on sophisticated analysis of unjust
enrichment theory by Oxford’s leading private law scholar.264
B. Constitutional Torts
A similar structure is found in suits against government officials for fail-
ing to prevent injuries—most vividly, claims against the police or social-ser-
vices agencies for delayed response to emergency calls for help.265  English
law sees these cases as private law torts.  The most recent decision by the UK
Supreme Court explains that its denial of liability was not based on special
immunities afforded to state defendants, but simply on plaintiffs’ failure to
meet the “duty” prong of a standard negligence claim.266
To the extent such claims are cognizable as a matter of federal law, they
are analyzed under substantive and procedural due process standards that
raise classically public law concerns.267  These inquiries are geared toward
assessing the state’s obligations to its citizens but are inapposite to the correl-
ative duty analysis grounding common-law tort claims.268
261 See Prudential Assurance Co. v. Revenue and Customs Comm’rs [2018] UKSC 39,
[2019] 1 All ER 308 [79]–[80] (Lord Reed DP) (holding that claimants can no longer
recover compound interest but availability of common-law restitution claims remains
unchanged); see also Littlewoods Ltd. [2018] 1 All ER [3]–[4], [72].
262 See Prudential Assurance Co. [2018] 1 All ER [65]–[66].
263 See id. at [50]–[65].
264 See id. at [68]–[80] (citing Andrew Burrows, Interest, in COMMERCIAL REMEDIES:
RESOLVING CONTROVERSIES 247, 266 (Graham Virgo & Sarah Worthington eds., 2017)).
265 See, e.g., Michael v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] 2
All ER 635 [138]–[39] (Lord Toulson SCJ) (reasoning that, under principles of common-
law negligence and barring special circumstances, police do not owe murder victims a duty
of care to timely respond to a 999 call). Compare X v. Bedfordshire Cnty. Council [1995] 3
All ER 353 (HL), with DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
194–97 (1989). See also Gorringe v. Calderdale Metro. Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15,
[2004] 2 All ER 326 [14]–[16] (Lord Hoffmann); Stovin v. Wise [1996] 3 All ER 801 (HL)
at 832 (Lord Hoffmann).
266 See Michael [2015] 2 All ER at [39]–[63], [101] (reasoning that, though “general
principles [of negligence] have been worked out for the most part in cases involving pri-
vate litigants, . . . they are equally applicable where D[efendant] is a public body”); see also
R ex rel. Jalloh v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept. [2020] UKSC 4, [33]–[34] (Lady Hale
SCJ) (holding state liable under common-law false imprisonment claim for imposing ille-
gal curfew held illegal under the Immigration Act).
267 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35, 339 (1976).
268 For example, Gonzales presented claims against the police for failing to enforce a
restraining order issued by a state court that would have prevented the father’s murder of
his three children. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, No. Civ.A.00 D 1285, 2001 WL
35973820, at *1–2 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2001), rev’d, 307 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2002), rev’d en
banc, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545
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Likewise, in cases where a police officer unlawfully detains or beats a
citizen, the resulting English lawsuit looks to the law of intentional torts.269
A federal action by contrast is only available if the injury is conceptualized as
a “constitutional tort,” and allows the officer to raise a defense of “qualified
immunity.”  This doctrine precludes liability unless the alleged violation has
been “clearly established” under prior case law.270  Because this defense is
not available to civil defendants, the doctrine further severs public tort law
from actions that sound in private law exclusively.271
C. Torts Committed by State Officials
Similar examples are found in the administrative law and general tort
context.  Take the case of a government official who wrongfully issued a
notice of detention against a ship that prevented it from leaving port.272  The
shipowners sued for damages since the detention caused them to breach
downstream contracts.  Litigation in the English courts revolved around a
conceptual riddle in the law of conversion.  Defendants argued the conver-
sion tort requires physical possession or restraint of the ship, while claimant
argued that restraint via legal process was sufficient.273
Likewise, the English Court of Appeals found an environmental-health
officer acting under statutory authority liable in tort for misstating the law
and causing plaintiff to spend large sums on remediation that was not legally
required.274  The High Court of Australia found a land-use commission liable
U.S. 748 (2005).  Four separate American courts agonized over the borderline between
substantive and procedural due process; whether the Supreme Court owed deference to
the circuit court’s interpretation of state law within the latter’s jurisdiction; whether some
combination of statutory language and the text printed on the back of a restraining order
create a constitutionally cognizable “property right” under federal standards; and whether
federal courts can be used to vindicate process rights allegedly conferred by state law. See
Gonzales, 2001 WL 35973820, at *4–5; Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1260–62; Gonzales, 366 F.3d at
1096–1101; Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 756–58, 766.
269 See ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 218–28 (2007); Marshall v. Osmond [1983]
2 All ER 225 (AC) at 227; Home Off. v. Dorset Yacht Co [1970] 2 All ER 294 (HL) at 297;
Gaynor v. Allen [1959] 2 All ER 644 (QB) at 646; Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep.
807 (KB) at 818.  Though the Law Commission has considered reforms, no changes have
been enacted. See LAW COMM’N, ADMINISTRATIVE REDRESS: PUBLIC BODIES AND THE CITIZEN
117–31 (2008).
270 See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 46–55
(2018); Chaim Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1156 (2005).
271 See Saiman, supra note 270, at 1155–56, 1161; see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701
(1976) (noting that the Due Process Clause should not become “a font of tort law to be
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States”).
272 See Club Cruise Ent. and Traveling Servs. Europe BV v. Dep’t for Trans. [2008]
EWCH (Comm) 2794 [1]–[12].
273 See id. at [39]–[56].
274 See Welton v. N. Cornwall Dist. Council [1997] 1 WLR 570 (AC). Compare id., with
United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 697–98, 771 (1961) (holding purchaser of real
estate could not proceed against inaccurate appraisal offered by Federal Housing Adminis-
tration since FTCA bars claims premised on misrepresentation).
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for common-law negligence for failing to advise a prospective buyer of a
road-widening plan.275  And a New Zealand appellate court ruled that a land
council which misinterpreted its zoning legislation is liable in tort to land-
owner X for permitting landowner Y to illegally obstruct X’s oceanfront
view.276
It is unlikely that either the metaphysics of conversion or common-law
negligence would become a recurring feature in contemporary American liti-
gation.  To the extent permitted, common-law tort suits against the federal
government must proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).  This
statute waives government immunity in designated cases, but bars all suits
against individual officials in the scope of their employment.277  Though the
FTCA does not formally replace the underlying tort law,278 the multiple
exemptions it offers channel doctrine away from private law and toward statu-
tory analysis of the FTCA’s complex regime.279
Scholars have documented how in an earlier era, American courts used
private/common-law doctrines to hold the state liable for civil violations.280
Tax refund cases looked to recoupment principles at common law and
equity,281 and suits against officials turned on standard tort principles as
glossed by defenses of official privilege and immunity.282  But as American
legal thought moved away from postrealist private law, procedural and statu-
tory frameworks came to dominate.  These areas became the loci of concep-
tualism and formalist practice, and carry the heavy burden of justifying state
liability law.
275 See Shaddock & Assocs Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (1981) 36 ALR 385, 408–09
(Austl.).
276 See Craig v. E. Coast Bays City Council [1986] 1 NZLR 99 (CA) at 101 (N.Z.); see also
Stapleton, supra note 104, at 559–61.
277 See FIGLEY, supra note 248, at 55–56.
278 Indeed, a prerequisite for FTCA liability is for the alleged wrong to constitute a tort
under relevant state private law. See id. at 25–55.
279 Several scholars have critiqued the FTCA regime for its complexity and resulting
confusion. See, e.g., Dianne Rosky, Respondeat Inferior: Determining the United States’ Liability
for the Intentional Torts of Federal Law Enforcement Officials, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 895, 958
(2003).
280 See Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History,
43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 207 (1991) (“[In prior eras,] ship and cargo owners often brought
damages actions against customs collectors and ship captains for wrongful seizures arising
out of claimed violations of federal trade restrictions.”).
281 In the restitution context, compare United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 602–04
(1990), with Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 261–63 (1935), and United States v. State
Bank, 96 U.S. 30, 35–36 (1878).
282 For a discussion of official immunity, see Woolhandler, supra note 280, at 204 (“His-
torically, citizen-initiated suits against governmental officials were brought as private law
actions. . . .  [T]he official was treated as a private person who had committed a tort or
other legal wrong.”); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 396 (1987) (exploring the historical models of official claims for
immunity from civil liability).
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VI. ERIE, PROCEDURE, AND PRIVATE LAW
I have mostly avoided discussing the impact of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins283 on the Anglo-American divide—but the standard account goes
as follows.  English private law remains a foundational part of the national
legal system, and the highest courts are its prime expositors and final arbi-
ters.  Following Erie, however, private law is said to reside with the states
alone.284  The U.S. Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in this area, and fed-
eral courts have no independent authority to articulate private law.
While Erie says nothing about the significance of private law or its rele-
vance to any legal issue, in designating it as “merely” state law beyond (or
beneath) the jurisdiction of federal courts, Erie effectively edges private law
out of the national spotlight.  By contrast, Erie and its progeny designate pro-
cedural, federal statutory, and federal public law doctrines as the founda-
tional responsibilities of the federal courts.  These doctrines establish the
platform on which federal litigation plays out, and academic prestige, theo-
rizing, and application to the nation’s most important questions followed.285
This account is largely correct, but I am less certain whether causation
runs in only one direction—from Erie’s constitutional mandate to the
marginalization of private law.  In the early decades of Erie’s life, the decision
had no bearing on whether private law was relevant to interpreting federal
statutes.286  Second, Erie says nothing about whether federal courts can
employ private law concepts to adjudicate governmental liability.  Finally,
becasue English and American law remain different even where the four cor-
ners of Erie do not apply suggests broader forces are at work.
For this reason, we should consider whether Erie is not simply the cause
of private law’s marginalization, but an expression of the realist forces that
led to this marginalization.  Abbe Gluck makes this point explicitly, noting
that “Erie culminated a sea change in how judges view law,” reflecting “a
move from the idea of a body of ‘natural,’ general, or universal legal princi-
ples” toward the view that law was a specific “policy choice linked to a particu-
lar jurisdiction.”287  Further, in Erie’s account, the fact that state and federal
articulations of the common law prove inconsistent is evidence that private
law is too malleable to produce consensus.288 Erie also draws on Holmes’s
denial that there are prepolitical or “transcendental” legal principles that
283 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
284 The complexities of the pre-Erie allocations of state and federal common-law
authority are explored in PURCELL, supra note 96, at 59–86.
285 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 44–45 &
n.36 (2000).
286 See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
287 See Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 131, at 1902; see also Larry
Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 283 (1992) (noting
that, post-Erie, the common law is “dead, a victim of positivism and realism”).
288 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (“Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had
revealed its defects, [that] . . . [p]ersistence of state courts in their own opinions on ques-
tions of common law prevented uniformity . . . .”).
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stand outside of a state,289 and his assumption that all lawmaking, whether
expressly statutory or unwritten private law, is a creation of the state.290
Erie’s realist underpinnings become clearer when considering how a
counterfactual decision might have read.  Faced with divergent common-law
results from state and federal jurisdictions, an Erie court assuming a formal-
ized account of private law would have reaffirmed the centrality of confined
analysis and established the conceptual framework to steer courts in this
direction.  Having assumed that prepolitical, partially autonomous law is a
fiction (used to promote corporate interests), Erie argues for the opposite.291
The intergovernmental experience of the Anglo-Commonwealth worlds
provides further evidence of Erie’s uniquely American provenance.  Australia
and Canada are federal systems, yet neither adopts Erie’s assumptions about
the nature of private law or how legal authority is allocated between overlap-
ping sovereigns.292  England is a unitary government, but the House of
Lords/Supreme Court of the United Kingdom hears civil appeals under
Scots law filtered through its own rendering of general principles of com-
mon/commercial law presumed to apply across the legal arena.  For much of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Privy Council heard appeals
from colonies across the world.293  Where underlying local law diverged from
English law, English law served as the prepolitical “general law” that carved
out space for specific local features.294  To this day, judges and scholars from
the UK, Canada, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong,
and South Africa engage in a transnational discourse anchored in the gen-
eral common-law principles of English private law.  Despite substantial diver-
sity in geography, constitutional structures, political climate, and substantive
law—nothing resembling an Anglo “Erie” emerged.
Though rarely articulated, the working assumption is that the common
law serves as the transjurisdictional legal substrate atop which other bodies of
law—local, legislative, or administrative—sit.295  This does not require a full-
blown commitment to natural law, or even a strong version of autonomous,
prepolitical law, but at minimum presupposes a domain of “lawyers’ law” that
289 Id. at 79 (first citing Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370–72 (1910)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); and then citing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532–36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
290 See id.
291 See PURCELL, supra note 285, at 262–72.
292 See Mark Leeming, Common Law Within Three Federations, 18 PUB. L. REV. 186 (2007)
(comparing the conceptualization and allocation of common law authority in Australia,
Canada, and the United States).
293 See Michaels, supra note 103, at 153–54 (“In its heyday, the Privy Council’s greatest
force lay not in imperial control over the colonies, but rather in its ability to symbolise how
the common law can bind together vastly different cultures.”).
294 See LORD MANCE & JACOB TURNER, PRIVY COUNCIL PRACTICE §§ 5.19–5.38 (2017).
295 For example, Priel’s account of English law is grounded in the coherence of founda-
tional legal categories and the rationale emerging from accumulated practices. See Priel,
supra note 1, at 610–12.
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is rightfully within the deliberative expertise of judges.296  American realism
rejected this vision of private law, shifting attention toward procedure, stat-
utes, and public law. Erie emerged from the same intellectual milieu and
encoded these understandings into American constitutional law.
CONCLUSION
This Article not only shows that law wants to be formal but explains why.
Formalism offers an answer to the countermajoritarian difficulty and the
problem of the least dangerous branch.  These questions flow from the
understanding—only fully realized in the twentieth century—that law is
something actively made by a polity rather than an external force acting
upon it.  But if democratically accountable legislatures are empowered to
make law and social policy, why should important questions be decided by
unrepresentative and unelected judges?
Both Scalia and Birks sought to answer this question by arguing the judi-
cial role requires reasoning from a conceptual core of autonomous princi-
ples distinct from value choices.  By formally applying the law’s conceptual
scheme, judges narrowly parse doctrinal intricacies, reserving broader social
considerations for the legislative domain.
Though not without its internal critics, English private law represents
the central case of law that stands outside political contestation and lends
stability to the system as a whole.  English private law is thus not only relevant
in the arena where it was forged, but plays a major role where American
lawyers expect it least: mediating between citizen and state and between
domestic UK law and supranational European institutions.  Owing to its sig-
nificance, careful analysis of the intricacies of private law doctrine is a central
feature of English caselaw, legal scholarship, and education.
American realists successfully deconstructed private law and under-
mined its status as a body of prepolitical legal principles.  But this success
correlates with the domain of private law having shrunk inward.  Contempo-
rary private law provides fewer dispositive decisional rules than in the past,
particularly in cases that are central to the legitimating narrative of the legal
system.  That task has shifted to statutory interpretation and legal processes
doctrines that govern the state and its lawmaking functions—precisely where
American formalist thought has flourished.
296 See Pettit v. Pettit [1969] 2 All ER 385 (HL) at 390 (Lord Reid); BURROWS, supra
note 141, at 77–81, 81 n.87 (2018) (positing a zone of “lawyer’s law” that is unlikely to be
addressed by legislation and is the legitimate domain of judicial development).
